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ABSTR ACT
‘Artificial womb’ technology is highly anticipated for the benefits it might
have as an alternative to neonatal intensive care and for pregnant people.
In the bioethical literature, it has been suggested that such technology will
force us to rethink the ethics of abortion. Some scholars have suggested
that a pregnant person may be entitled to end a pregnancy but, with the
advent of ectogestation, they may not be unilaterally entitled to opt for an
abortion where the other genetic progenitor does not agree. Following two
high-profile cases in England andWales in the late 70s and 80s, English law
is clear that genetic progenitors who do not gestate have no say in abortion
decisions. Itmight be argued, however, that ectogestation casts doubt on the
exclusion of all claims by genetic progenitors. In this article, I assess what
a legal challenge to a decision to opt for abortion might look like with the
advent of this technology, by examining whether genetic progenitors have
† Dr. ElizabethChloeRomanis is an assistant professor of Biolaw atDurhamLawSchool,DurhamUniversity.
Chloe recently passed her Wellcome Trust-funded PhD at the University of Manchester. She was awarded
the University ofManchester distinguished achievement medal for humanities research student of the year
2020 for her thesis on artificial womb technology.Chloe has published extensively on the ethico-legal issues
in gestation surrounding the development of artificial womb technologies as an alternative to neonatal
intensive care. Her broader research interests include abortion law and policy, choice in childbirth and
decision-making in obstetrics and feminist legal theory. Chloe currently teaches Contemporary Issues in
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the locus standi or grounds to seek an injunction to prevent abortion. I argue
that such a challenge is unlikely to be successful.
K E Y W O R D S: abortion, artificial wombs, putative fathers
I. INTRODUCTION
‘Putative fathers’1 are legally impotent in abortion decisions in England andWales. The
law vests all decision-making power concerning abortion in doctors, in consultation
with pregnant people.2 The interests of genetic progenitors who do not gestate in
abortion decisions are afforded no legal recognition.3 This is unsurprising because
decisions during pregnancy concerning the fetus necessarily involve the pregnant
person’s body.4 However, developments in reproductive medicine have improved the
ability of all persons with the capacity to become pregnant to control, by limiting
or enhancing, their ability to reproduce5 including alternative routes to gestate,6 or
potentially to opt out of gestation.7 Reproductive liberty has come to be perceived as
a fundamental freedom, which is sometimes claimed to be ‘gender-neutral’.8 Despite
reproductive liberty often being seen as gender-neutral, decisions about beginning or
ending a pregnancy are still limited to the discretion of those persons who do the
gestation. Some bioethicists, however, have argued that anticipated ‘artificial womb’
1 In surveying the literature on this issue, and in attempting to write about it, one of the more difficult tasks
is determining the appropriate language to use to describe the various people who consider themselves
invested in a decision about abortion. The terms ‘mother’ and ‘father’, whenmaking reference to the genetic
relationship of genetic progenitors to a fetus, are inappropriate, because they imply a parenting relationship
that does not yet exist. ‘Putative’ is therefore used to indicate that themale genetic progenitor of a fetusmay
consider themselves to be, or that they will be soon in the future, a father.
2 David Nolan, Abortions: Should Men Have a Say? in Abortion Law and Politics Today, 221 (E. Lee,
eds, 1998). I refer to pregnant people, rather than pregnant women, in recognition of the fact that not all
persons with the physiology to get pregnant, and who need abortions, identify as women. This is not to
deny that the vast majority of people who do get pregnant and need abortions identify as women or that
this has been an important part of the historical and structural oppression of pregnant people, but to be
inclusive to all of those persons who are non-binary or identify as men andmay also be in need of abortion
care. I have, however, specifically referred to pregnant women where quoting directly from other people, or
where the law specifies pregnant woman rather than pregnant person, as there are times when this might be
material. I have also specifically used the term woman where this is clearly how a specific person identifies
to avoid misgendering them.
3 Marie Fox, Abortion Decision-Making—Taking Men’s Needs Seriously, in Abortion Law and Politics
Today, 202 (E. Lee, ed., 1998).
4 There are convincing metaphysical arguments that the foetus is a part of the pregnant person’s body. See
Elselijn Kingma,Were you a part of your mother? 128Mind 609 (2019).
5 E.g. Jennifer Bard, Immaculate Conception? How will Ectogenesis Change Current Paradigms of Social Rela-
tionships and Values? in Ectogenesis: Artificial Womb Technology and the Future of Human
Reproduction, 149 (S. Gelfand and J. Shook, eds, 2006); Rosemary Tong, Out of Body Gestation: In
Whose Best Interests? in Ectogenesis: Artificial Womb Technology and the Future of Human
Reproduction, 59 (S. Gelfand and J. Shook, eds, 2006);
6 Gestational surrogacy, uterus transplantation and potentially ectogestation (facilitated by ‘artificial womb’
technology).
7 See, for example, the ability to opt out of gestation later in pregnancy facilitated by ‘artificial womb’ tech-
nology: Natasha Hammond-Browning, A New Dawn: Ectogenesis, Future Children and Reproductive Choice,
14Contemporary Issues in Law349 (2018); ElizabethChloe Romanis,Artificial Womb Technology and
the Choice to Gestate Ex Utero: Is Partial Ectogenesis the Business of the Criminal Law? 28Med. Law. Rev. 342
(2020).
8 J Raymond, Women as Wombs: Reproductive Technologies and the Battle Over Women’s
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technology would mean that genetic progenitors who do not gestate9 should have a
greater say in abortion decisions.10
Two research teams in the United States and Western Australia/Japan have con-
tinued to publish successful results11 of animal testing of ‘artificial womb prototype
devices’ since they first announced successful designs in 2017.12 The intention is that,
by continuing the process of gestation ex utero, these devices might be able to reduce
the incidence of morbidity and mortality amongst neonates delivered prematurely.13
By continuing the process of gestation, these devices assist in the continued process of
creationof humanentities artificially.This process is termedpartial ectogestation;14 the
transfer of an fetus thatwas initially gestated in a pregnant person’swomb to an ‘artificial
womb’ to allow it to develop to term (around 37 weeks).15 Partial ectogestation is
sought after as an alternative to dangerous/uncomfortable pregnancies for pregnant
people experiencing health risks,16 and a superior alternative to conventional neonatal
intensive care.17 Several scholars argue that since ‘artificial wombs’ bring the possibility
of pregnancy termination that does not necessarily result in fetal death,18 and the
potential erasure of the established viability threshold,19 their introduction forces us
9 These arguments are usually made in respect of ‘putative fathers’ e.g. male genetic progenitors. But it
is plausible that these claims would extend to other non-gestating genetic progenitors, for example, in a
situation in which a gestational surrogate is carrying a pregnancy. In this instance there will be both a male
and female non-gestational genetic progenitor. I do not consider the case of gestational surrogacy in this
article.
10 Iain Brassington, The Glass Womb, in Reprogen-Ethics and the Future of Gender, (F. Simonstein,
ed., 2009); JoonaRäsänen,Ectogenesis, abortion and a right to the death of the fetus,31Bioethics697 (2017).
11 Emily Partridge and others, An Extrauterine System to Physiologically Support the Extreme Premature Lamb,
8 Nat. Commun. 15112 (2017); Haruo Usuda and others, Successful use of an artificial placenta to support
extremely preterm ovine fetuses at the border of viability, 221 Am. J. Obstet. Gyneco. 69.e1 (2019).
12 Id; Haruo Usuda and others, Successful maintenance of key physiological parametersin preterm lambs treated
with ex vivo uterine environment therapy for a period of 1 week, 217 Am. J. Obstet. Gyneco. 457e.1 (2017).
13 Id; Elizabeth Chloe Romanis, Artificial womb technology and the frontiers of human reproduction: conceptual
differences and potential implications, 44 J. Med. Ethics. 751 (2018).
14 It is also referred to as ‘partial ectogenesis’. I use ectogestation in recognition of the importance of distin-
guishing ectogestation from ‘ectogenesis’ see: ElselijnKingma and Suki Finn,Neonatal Incubator or Artificial
Womb? Distinguishing Ectogestation and Ectogenesis using the Metaphysics of Pregnancy, 34 Bioethics 354
(2020).
15 Christopher Kaczor, Artificial Wombs and Embryo Adoption, in The Ethics of Embryo Adoption and
the Catholic Tradition: Moral Argumnets, Economic Reality and Social Analysis, 310 (S.
Bracman and D.Weaver, eds, 2003).
16 Romanis, supra note 7, at 349–250.
17 Romanis, supra note 13, at 752; Kingma and Finn, supra note 14, at 355.
18 Robert Favole, Artificial Gestation: New Meaning for the Right to Terminate Pregnancy, 21 Ariz. L. Rev. 755
(1979); Peter Singer and Deanne Wells, Ectogenesis, in Ectogenesis: Artificial Womb Technology
and the Future of Human Reproduction, (S. Gelfand and J. Shook, eds, 2006); Amel Alghrani, The
Legal and Ethical Ramifications of Ectogenesis, Asian Journal of WTO and International Health
Law and Policy 189 (2007); Vernellia Randall and Tshaka Randall, Built in Obsolescence: The Coming
End to the Abortion Debate, 4 Journal of Health & Biomedical Law 291 (2008); Christine Overall,
Rethinking Abortion, Ectogenesis and Fetal Death, 46 J Soc Philos. 126 (2015); Eric Mathison and Jeremy
Davis, Is there a right to the death of the foetus? 31 Bioethics 313 (2017); Perry Hendricks,There is no right
to the death of the fetus, 32 Bioethics 395 (2018); Bruce Blackshaw and Daniel Rodger, Ectogenesis and
the case against the right to the death of the foetus, 33 Bioethics 76 (2019); William Simkulet, Abortion and
Ectogenesis: Moral Compromise, 46 J. Med. Ethics 93 (2020).
19 I. Glenn Cohen, ArtificialWombs and Abortion Rights, 47Hastings Cent. Rep. (2017); Romanis, supra
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to rethink the ethics of abortion.20 Some argue that, if it is possible for gestation to be
continued by a machine ex utero, a pregnant person would have the moral right to opt
out of pregnancy, but they would not be unilaterally entitled to choose a method of
terminating pregnancy that results in fetal death. Some scholars21 submit that abortion
resulting in fetal deathwould never be justifiable in these circumstances; others22 argue
that abortion would be justifiable but potentially only where both genetic progenitors
agree. Others have also explored questions about whether the subject of an ‘artificial
womb’ could be terminated by turning the womb off’.23 There would also be questions
here about the extent to which both genetic progenitors should be involved in any
decision to end ectogestation (and thus terminate the subject of the artificial womb),24
but for the purposes of this article, I will set aside questions about the legalities of this
to focus on abortion.
In this article, I address these claims about abortion, and specifically the involvement
of non-gestating genetic progenitors, from an ethico-legal perspective. While there has
been much debate about the abortion decision with this technology available, there
has been limited examination of such claims in the context of the legal framework in
England and Wales. Assuming the availability of partial ectogestation, can a genetic
progenitor/putative (non-gestational) parent assert a legal right to parent a developing
human entity because they would be able to do so without forcing a person to remain
pregnant? For several decades, it has been express legal orthodoxy that ‘husbands have
no standing to oppose an abortion agreed to by the wife, nor has any putative “father”
any right to intervene to save the fetus, nor can anyone argue that the fetus itself has
legal personality so enabling them to act as its “guardian” and prevent an abortion’.25
The willingness of non-gestating genetic progenitors to challenge a pregnant person’s
decision to terminate a pregnancy has been evidenced by cases in England,26 Scot-
20 Singer andWells, supra note 18; Blackshaw and Rodger, supra note 18; Christopher Stratman, Ectogestation
and the Problem of Abortion, Philosophy&Technology (2020) doi.org/10.1007/s13347-020-00427-2.
21 Hendricks, supra note 18; Blackshaw and Rodger, supra note 18.
22 Brassington, supra note 10; Räsänen, supra note 10; Evie Kendal has also considered this question, though
taking the opposite view to Räsänen (and did not engage with Brassington) to argue that non-gestational
genetic progenitors would have no say in the decision of how to terminate a pregnancy evenwith the advent
of ectogestation. See: Evie Kendal, Pregnant people, inseminators and tissues of human origin: how ectogenesis
challenges the concept of abortion, 38Monash Bioeth Rev 197 (2020).
23 A. Algrhani, Regulating Assisted Reproductive Technologies: New Horizons, 148 (Cam-
bridge University Press, 2018); Daniel Rodger, Nicholas Colgrove and Bruce Blackshaw,Gestaticide: killing
the subject of an artificial womb, J. Med. Ethics (2020) 10.1136/medethics-2020-106708.
24 The issue here is interesting because there are some more complexities in relation to this question than
that of abortion that I outline in this article. This is because once in an artificial womb the same arguments
cannot be made about what is done to the developing entity affecting the physicality of a pregnant person.
This means it is possible to afford the developing human entity more respect without it impacting heavily
on the autonomy of an existing individual. However, I think there is some room to reflect on whether the
issues I will raise with regard to the gendered aspects of childrearing might also still have some bearing on
whether an artificial womb can be ‘switched off’. On a related note theremight be questions aboutwhether a
(putative) fatherwould have a say in the decision to use experimental ‘artificial womb’ technology to sustain
a foetus—see: Amel Alghrani andMargot Brazier,What is it? Whose it? Re-positioning the fetus in the context
of research? 70 Camb. Law J 51 (2011).
25 M. Brazier andE.Cave,Medicine, Patients andtheLaw, 426 (ManchesterUniversity Press, 2016).
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land,27 Canada,28 and the United States.29 In England and Wales, the cases of C v
S30 and Paton,31 heard over two decades ago, appear to have ‘put to bed’ abortion
challenges by genetic progenitors (in all of these casesmen).However, somehave raised
the question of whether ectogestationmight ‘enhance or diminishmen’s [or other non-
gestational genetic progenitor’s] rights to have input in abortion decisions?’32 It might
be suggested that partial ectogestation casts doubt on the exclusion of all legal claims by
non-gestational genetic progenitors33 to intervene in the abortion decision. The claims
at issue are different: the claim is not that the pregnant person has no right to abortion,
but that they must submit to a particular kind of abortion (that does not interfere with
the non-gestating genetic progenitor’s ‘right to parent’). It could be argued, therefore,
that the matter should be revisited.
It is important to consider this question in light of the increasing volume of lit-
erature addressing the rights of genetic progenitors with ‘artificial wombs’.34 While
the utility of applying contemporary legal frameworks to future technologies might be
questioned,35 I believe the exercise is essential to highlight any potential conceptual
flaws (or absence of) in the way the law is currently constructed; and that discussion
about what the law should be can only follow an understanding of what the law is. The
law is often slow to react to advances in science and technology. It is not unimaginable
that, if ectogestative technology came to fruition, there would be attempts by non-
gestating genetic progenitors to legally challenge pregnant people’s decisions about
their pregnancy (and thus their body); therefore, it is important to examine what this
challenge might look like, and how the law should respond to it.
In this article, I consider what a potential legal challenge by a genetic progenitor
might look like in England and Wales, and the likelihood of such a challenge suc-
ceeding. Before examining this claim, I will first establish what partial ectogestation
is (part II) and how and why abortion would remain lawful in England and Wales
following the advent of this technology (part III). In part IV, I outline the reasons
why some bioethicists have suggested that the question of who has a say in decisions
about abortion might change with the advent of ectogestation, and why we should
consider what a potential legal challenge might look like. Finally, I demonstrate why a
27 Kelly v Kelly [1997] Sc 285 (Scotland).
28 Tremblay v Daigle (1989) 2 S.C.R. 530 (Canadian Supreme Court).
29 Planned Parenthood v Casey 1992 112 U.S. 2791 (United States Supreme Court).
30 C v S, supra note 26.
31 Paton, supra note 26.
32 Scott Gelfand, Introduction, in Ectogenesis: Artificial Womb Technology and the Future of
Human Reproduction, (S. Gelfand and J. Shook, eds, 2006).
33 Though not the subject of this article, I note here there may also be situations in which there are more
persons involved in the conception and gestation of a foetus than two genetic progenitors who conceive
naturally, for example, where the putative parents use gamete donors, or a gestational surrogate. I will refer
to both genetic progenitors and/or putative parents (those who intend to have a parenting relationship
with the gestating entity if/when it is born) where necessary, noting that these may sometimes be the same
people.
34 E.g. Brassington, supra note 10; Räsänen, supra note 10.
35 Horn, for example, stipulates that ‘the literature on . . . [ectogestation] and abortion that emerges from legal
scholarship is frequently preoccupied with accepting the law as it is rather than exploring law as it could be’.
See C. Horn, Gestation Beyond Mother Machine: Legal Frameworks for Artificial Wombs, Abortion and Care,
(2020) (PhD thesis, Birkbeck University of London), at 152. Adopting a doctrinal approach to examining
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non-gestating genetic progenitor has—and would continue to have—no locus standi
to seek an injunction to prevent a pregnant person having an abortion (part V), and
even if they could seek an injunction, there would be no grounds on which it would
be awarded such that a pregnant person would be prevented from having an abortion
(part VI). The availability of partial ectogestation, I argue, does not legally empower a
genetic progenitor to participate in decisions about how to terminate a pregnancy.
II. PARTIAL ECTOGESTATION: ARTIFICIAL AMNION
AND PLACENTA TECHNOLOGY36
In 2017, two teams of working research groups in the United States and Western
Australia/Japan published results of ‘artificial womb prototypes’37 and they continue
to regularly publish their success with animal testing.38 A third team based in the
Netherlands announced that they had received funding to build their own prototype
in 2019.39 As progress has continued to maintain momentum, many have speculated
that a functional ‘artificial womb’ might be available in the next 5–10 years.40 While
these technologies are often referred to as ‘artificial wombs’, they are more accurately,
as a result of their function, described as an artificial placenta (AAPT).41
AAPTprototypes are sealed systems, inwhich the subject is surrounded by artificial
amniotic fluid with cannula acting as an umbilical cord and assisted by a pump-less
oxygenator circuit. These features enable the subject, termed the ‘gestateling’,42 to
continue to develop vital organs, and with them the capacity for independent life,
rather than being forced to adapt to the external environment. The technology, inmore
directly replicating the function of the placenta, enables the gestateling to maintain
fetal physiology and physicality in order to continue to develop.43 This technology is
designedwith the intention of revolutionizing neonatal intensive care,44 because of the
inherent limitations of conventional technologies in preterm care continue to result in
high incidences of morbidity and mortality.45 AAPT might procure better outcomes
for preterms and parent(s) by minimizing the damage done to the developing human
entity’s bodybybeing in the external environment prematurely, and the continuationof
gestation would enable their complete development before ‘birth’. It is also stipulated
that ectogestation might be able to save human entities delivered even more prema-
turely than can survive in conventional care because the devices are not subject to
36 This term was first adopted by Kingma and Finn, supra note 14, at 364.
37 Partridge and others, supra note 11; Usuda and others, supra note 12.
38 E.g.MatthewHornick andothers,Technical feasibility of umbilical cannulation in midgestation lambs supported
by the EXTra-uterine Environment for Neonatal Development (EXTEND), (2019) 43 Artif. Organs 1154
(2019); Usuda and others, supra note 12.
39 Nicola Davies, Artificial Womb: Dutch researchers given e2.9 m to develop prototype, https://www.thegua
rdian.com/society/2019/oct/08/artificial-womb-dutchresearchers-given-29m-to-develop-prototype
(accessed Apr. 21, 2020).
40 Partridge and others, supra note 11, at 11.
41 Kingma and Finn, supra note 14, at 364.
42 This is the term used to describe the subject of the artificial placenta: supra note 13, at 753.
43 For a full defense of this conceptual distinction see id; ElizabethChloeRomanis,Artificial Womb Technology
and the Significance of Birth: Why Gestatelings Are Not Newborns (or Fetuses), 45 J.Med. Ethics 728 (2019);
Kingma and Finn, supra note 14.
44 Partridge and others, supra note 11, at 11; Romanis, supra note 13, at 753.
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the same constraints of gestational maturity.46 AAPT, if proved successful, could come
to replace neonatal intensive care and potentially influence medical decision-making
about complex pregnancies.47 AAPT may also change lay and medical perceptions of
fetal viability.48
For the purposes of argument, I will assume this technology (that, at present, is
only in the early stages of animal testing) is available. It is important to highlight,
however, that AAPT as it is currently being developed is only capable of facilitating
partial ectogestation. The function of the devices is entirely dependent on the subject
having fetal physiology (for example, because the device is reliant on the subject’s
own heartbeat to assist the oxygenator circuit).49 The process of embryogenesis—the
formation of the critical vital organs between embryo and fetus—is far more complex
and little is known about how this might be artificially facilitated.50 Thus, when we
discuss AAPT, we are not discussing a device that can grow human entities ‘from
scratch to birth’, but a device that can support the continued gestationof human entities
delivered prematurely (at least 13 weeks or beyond). It is also pertinent to note that
the necessary process of ‘fetal extraction’ to remove a fetus from a person’s womb for
continued gestation in AAPT would inevitably resemble some form of a caesarean
section performed on the pregnant person. A C-section is the surgical opening of the
abdomen and uterus to deliver the fetus. Risks include excessive blood loss, clotting,
infection and the use of anesthetic carries its own risks.51 C-sections are, however,
established procedures; a ‘fetal extraction’ procedure would be an ‘experimental C-
section’.52 Steps would have to be taken to ensure the fetus could be moved to an
ectogestative device safely.53 Moreover, earlier in pregnancy, the procedure is much
more dangerous and more likely to damage a person’s womb.54
III. PARTIAL ECTOGESTATION AND ABORTION
AAPT brings a wealth of possibilities,55 but it is the question of the permissibility of
abortion that repeatedly captures the imagination of the bioethical literature.56 The
46 Id. at 752. AAPT will be subject to some limitations—this is discussed in the next section.
47 Romanis, supra note 7, at 349–350.
48 Viability is defined as ‘the ability [for a developing foetus] to survive independent of a pregnant woman’s
womb’. It has been argued that viability should be interpreted as the ability for a developing human entity
to survive ex gestation: Elizabeth Chloe Romanis, Is ‘viability’ viable? Abortion, conceptual confusion and the
law in England and Wales and the United States, J law Biosci (2020) doi.org/10.1093/jlb/lsaa059.We will
return to this point later in this article.
49 I am grateful to Elselijn Kingma and Joanne Verweij for ongoing discussions about the workability of this
technology and its limitations.
50 Emily Jackson,Degendering Reproduction, 16Med. Law Rev. 346, 358 (2008).
51 National Health Service, Caesarean Section; Risks, https://www.nhs.uk/conditions/caesarean-section/ri
sks/ (accessed Aug. 4, 2020).
52 Julien Murphy, Is Pregnant Necessary? Feminist Concerns about Ectogenesis, in Ectogenesis: Artificial
Womb Technology and the Future of Human Reproduction, 34 (S. Gelfand and J. Shook, eds,
2006).
53 For example, the administration of drugs to prevent fluid from draining from the lungs.
54 I am grateful to Dr Joanne Verweij for discussions about the nature of this procedure.
55 Most notably, the technology could provide aid to pregnant people experiencing dangerous, but wanted
pregnancies, see Hammond-Browning, supra note 7 and Romanis, supra note 7.
56 See supra note 18; Horn, supra note 35; Claire Horn, Ectogenesis is for Feminists, 6 Catalyst: Feminism,
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technology is heralded as introducing the possibility of ‘termination of pregnancy that
does not result in fetal death’.57 Some scholars speculate that AAPT could ensure the
survival of developing human entities much earlier in gestation, to the point that it
becomes an ‘alternative’ to abortion. In this section, I demonstrate that abortion is and
should remain lawful notwithstanding the development of AAPT. This is a necessary
preliminary to discussion of the rights of non-gestating genetic progenitors in abortion
decisions after AAPT.
III. A. The Law
Abortion remains a criminal offence in England andWales under the Offences Against
the Person Act 1861 (OAPA 1861) and the Infant Life (Preservation) Act 1929 (ILPA
1929). The OAPA 1861 stipulates that a person commits the offence of unlawfully
procuringmiscarriage, where they take any steps to procuremiscarriage, by anymeans,
with the intention of procuring a miscarriage.58 The ILPA 1929 creates the offence
of ‘child destruction’ committed when any person, with the intention of destroying
the life of a ‘child capable of being born alive’, by willful act causes a ‘child capable of
being born alive’ to die before it has been born.59 Termination of pregnancy is only
legally permissible under ‘clearly invoked exceptions’60 in the Abortion Act 1967 (AA
1967).61 Under section 1 (1)(a) an abortion is lawful before 24 weeks gestation where
two registered medical practitioners agree (having formed their opinion in good faith)
that continuing pregnancy poses greater risk to the life, physical or mental health of the
pregnant person62 or that of existing children of their family than if the pregnancywere
terminated.When determining the extent towhich continuing a pregnancy poses a risk
to a person’s health ‘accountmay be taken of the pregnant woman’s actual or reasonably
foreseeable environment’.63 After 24 weeks, abortion is only legally permissible in a
much narrower set of circumstances.64
57 Though, it is already well established that termination of pregnancy need not result in fetal death in some
circumstances later in pregnancy; for example, where pregnancies are induced early in dangerous situations
with the express aim of ‘saving’ both pregnant person and their foetus.
58 Offences Against the Person Act 1861, s.58. A pregnant person only unlawfully procures their miscarriage
if they are pregnant, whereas other persons can be found guilty of this offence evenwhere the personwhose
miscarriage they intended to procure was not actually pregnant. It is also important to note that this Act
specifically refers to pregnant women. However, I believe that the statute can be read to be inclusive of
persons with different gender identities who are pregnant.
59 Infant Life (Preservation) Act 1929, s.1 (1).
60 Amel Alghrani, Regulating the Reproductive Revolution: Ectogenesis—A Regulatory Minefield? in Law and
Bioethics: Volume 11, 309–310 (M. Freedman, ed., 2008).
61 Abortion Act 1967, s.1 (unlawful procurement of miscarriage) and s.5 (child destruction).
62 The Act specifically refers to pregnant women. I believe that the Abortion Act 1967 is likely to apply to all
pregnant people, and not just women, but an anonymous reviewer points out that it is important to specify
the exact language that is used in the statute. There have been recent cases related to reproduction in which
judges have been very focused on the language used in statutes governing reproductive technologies. For
example, in the first instance judgment of R (on the application of TT) v Registrar General for England and
Wales (AIRE Centre intervening) [2019] EWHC 2384 (Fam), Sir Andrew McFarlane did elucidate that
where a statute refers specifically to women, it need not necessarily mean that it can always be read to
encompass men. I do not believe that the fact the Abortion Act 1967 refers specifically to pregnant women
would prevent a person of a different gender identity from obtaining an abortion.
63 Abortion Act, s.1 (2).
64 Abortion is lawful after 24 weeks by virtue of the Abortion Act 1967 only where necessary to prevent
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There is no legal right to have an abortion;65 a person must convince a doctor that
they require an abortion and that they are entitled to it.66While the law is thus framed in
away that perpetuates abortion stigma,67 access remains relatively liberal under section
1(1)(a); the criterion under which the majority of abortions are performed.68 This
section is so broad it renders ‘every pregnancy lawfully terminable within the first 24
weeks’.69 Early abortions are substantially less risky than continuance of pregnancy,70
and therefore, almost all pregnant people before 20 weeks gestation satisfy this crite-
rion.71 Furthermore, though the law is such that pregnant people are not themselves
empowered to make the decision, the information that they present to the consulting
professional when accessing abortion care ‘is going to be at the heart of the matter . . .
if . . . [medical professionals] are to arrive at a decision in good faith’.72
III. B. Abortion Remains Lawful Notwithstanding AAPT
It has been widely noted that the introduction of AAPT would not affect abortion
provision under section 1(1)(a) of the AA 1967 as it is currently constructed.73 The
AA1967doesnot require that a pregnant personwhosedoctor believes they are eligible
for legal termination should consider, or choose, any form of abortion in particular—
especially any form of termination that might secure freedom from pregnancy without
compromising fetal development.The strongest argument that theymust do so ismade
by interpreting the ILPA 1929 tomean that a fetus is ‘capable of being born alive’ at the
point that it is capable of being transferred to AAPT.74 This would have the effect of
criminalizing the killing of such a fetus, and so the only option—if a person wanted to
end their pregnancy—would be to submit to ‘extraction’ for AAPT. Even if this case
the pregnancy risks the life of the pregnant person per s.1(1)(c), or where there is a substantial risk that the
foetus is seriously handicapped per s.1(1)(d).
65 JoBridgeman,A Woman’s Right to Choose? in AbortionLawandPoliticsToday, 77 (E. Lee, ed., 1998).
66 Emily Jackson, Abortion, Autonomy and Prenatal Diagnosis, 9 Social & Legal Studies 467, 471 (2000).
67 See S. Sheldon, Beyond Control: Medical Power and Abortion Law (Pluto Press 1997).
68 In 2019, 99% of abortions in England and Wales were carried out under a ground stipulated
in s.1(1)(a). See Department of Health and Social Care, Abortion Statistics, England and Wales:
2019, https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/
file/891405/abortion-statistics-commentary-2019.pdf (accessed Oct. 26, 2020), 10.
69 E. Jackson, Regulating Reproduction: Law, Technology and Autonomy, 80 (Hart Publishing,
2001).
70 Brazier and Cave, supra note 25, at 404–405.
71 There is, therefore, a substantial period of time in which pregnant people are effectively empowered, in
consultation with doctors, to elect for termination of pregnancy. This is not to say that 24 weeks is an
adequate amount of time for every pregnant person to access care—some pregnant people need access to
care later in gestation e.g. those who are older or younger so do not recognize their symptoms as pregnancy:
Leah Eades, Social realities, biological realities: The 24-week fetus in contemporary English abortion activism, 74
Women’s Stud. Int. Forum 20, 24 (2019).
72 Paton, supra note 26, at 281 per Baker P.
73 Alghrani, supra note 23, at 148; Jackson, supra note 50, at 362; Elizabeth Chloe Romanis, Challenging the
‘Born Alive’ Threshold: Fetal Surgery, Artificial Wombs, and the English Approach to Legal Personhood, 28
Med. Law Rev. 93, 116 (2020); Horn, supra note 35, at 81; Victoria Adkins, Impact of ectogenesis on the
medicalisation of pregnancy and childbirth, J. Med. Ethics doi: 10.1136/medethics-2019-106004 (2020).
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could be persuasively made,75 section 1(1)(a) still provides a defense.76 A suggested
amendment to the AA 1967 that a pregnant person should be obligated to end their
pregnancy in a way that increases the likelihood of fetal survival after the fetus was
‘capable of being born alive’ was defeated in theHouse of Lords debate in 1990.77 In the
absence of this requirement in current law, unless Parliament were to repeal or amend
the OAPA 1861, ILPA 1929 and AA 1967 in future, pregnant people would retain the
ability (with their doctor’s permission) to seek abortion under current provisions.
The form that abortion takes depends on the gestational stage of the pregnancy and
the pregnant person’s preferences. A competent pregnant person is entitled to accept or
refuse any medical procedure, ‘or to choose one rather than another of the treatments
being offered’.78 Thus, it would be possible for a pregnant person to refuse consent
to ‘fetal extraction’ for partial ectogestation and opt instead for early medical abortion
(before 12 weeks gestation)79 or surgical abortion.
Furthermore, English law recognizes that people have a right to choose between
reasonable treatment alternatives depending on their values, wishes, and preferences.80
InMontgomery, Lady Hale explained:
As NICE (2011) puts it “pregnant women should be offered evidence-based information
and support to enable them to make informed decisions and their care and treatment”
(para 1.1.1.1). Gone are the days when it was thought that, on becoming pregnant, a
woman lost, not only her capacity, but also her right to act as a genuinely autonomous
human being.81
In the AAPT context, the decision about how to terminate a pregnancy would not
necessarily have to be made solely on the basis of not wanting to be pregnant anymore
(or on purely medical grounds), but instead would be a matter of a pregnant person’s
preferences for abortion or AAPT.82
The biggest threat in English abortion law as currently constructed to a pregnant
person’s access to abortion is the result of the legislationbeing afirmlymedicalmodel—
thus allowing doctors to refuse to provide abortion care. A doctor need not perform
abortion when they have a conscientious objection, unless necessary to save the life of
a pregnant person or prevent serious permanent damage to their health.83 The greatest
75 I will return to this point later in this article.
76 Abortion Act, s.5 as amended by the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act, s.37 stipulates that ‘no
offence under the Infant Life (Preservation) Act shall be committed by a registered medical practitioner
who terminates a pregnancy in accordance with the provisions of this Act’.
77 Hl Vol 522 Cols 1043–1087.
78 Re T (Adult: Refusal of Treatment) [1993] Fam 95, at 102 per Lord Donaldson.
79 The World Health Organization notes that early medical abortion is very safe before 9 weeks’ gestation
and makes a ‘weak’ recommendation that early medical abortion can be administered until approximately
12 weeks’ gestation, though there is more limited evidence on the safety of early medical abortion
between 9 and 12 weeks’. See: World Health Organization, Safe abortion: Technical and Policy Guidance for
Health Systems, https://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/handle/10665/70914/9789241548434_eng.pdf?se
quence=1 (accessed Oct. 22, 2020).
80 Montgomery v Lanarkshire [2015] Uksc 11 The ratio of this case emphasizes that there is a responsibility
on doctors to disclose reasonable alternatives at para 46 per Lords Kerr and Reed.
81 Id, at para 116 per Lady Hale.
82 I am grateful to Professor Emma Cave for discussion ofMontgomery v Lanarkshire in this context.
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danger is thus an unregulated trend of doctors being increasingly uncomfortable with
abortion as AAPT becomes more available.84 However, because of the permissive
framing of section 1(1)(a) and because there are a substantial number of medical
professionals committed to the idea that abortion is essential healthcare,85 I believe
this to be unlikely.86
III. C. Abortion Remains Necessary Notwithstanding AAPT
Convincing defenses of the necessity of abortion remaining available even if AAPT
comes to fruitionhavebeen advancedbyCannold,87 Horn,88 Romanis andHorn89 and
Kendal90 amongst others. I will briefly consider these arguments here to demonstrate
that the availability of ectogestation does not prevent abortion from being considered
a reasonable treatment alternative (per Montgomery v Lanarkshire)91 in the context of
ending pregnancy.
Singer and Wells argue that ‘freedom to choose what happens to one’s body is one
thing; freedom to insist on the death of a being that is capable of living outside one’s
body is another thing’.92 I agree with Kendal, however, that ‘common justifications
for the permissibility of abortion can also serve as arguments for why the existence
of artificial wombs need not compromise abortion rights’.93 Questions about the
permissibility of abortion following the advent of AAPTwill always be questions about
a pregnant person’s body and their bodily autonomy. Partial ectogestation ‘begins with
a pregnant person’s body and necessarily involves the body of a pregnant person’.94 The
fetus is a physical part of the pregnant person.95
84 Romanis, supra note 73, at 116; there is little empirical evidence as yet to support this conclusion. There
has, however, been one study in which 41% of Australian doctors indicated that AAPT would change
their opinions about abortion provision at 22 weeks gestation: Lydia Di Stefano and others, Ectogestation
ethics: The implications of artificially extending gestation for viability, newborn resuscitation and abortion, 34
Bioethics 371, 377 (2020).
85 The vastmajority of abortions in theUK are provided by charitable providers such as the British Pregnancy
Advisory Service. It is reasonable to suppose that the staff who choose to work for this service share this
belief.
86 Even those doctors who wish to refuse to provide abortion must refer people to doctors that will provide
abortionwhere lawful per s.4 of the AbortionAct 1967. The difficulty with this is, however, that evenwhere
doctors attempt to fulfill this obligation, their communication of the fact that abortion is permissible in
the person’s circumstances could easily be ineffective. Jackson notes that many people can ‘mistake their
doctor’s lack of cooperation as an indication of their ineligibility for termination’, and observes that others,
especially those with a limited education, could lack the knowledge or confidence to seek advice elsewhere
if their doctor was unhelpful or even actively obstructive: supra note 69, at 86.
87 Leslie Cannold,Women, Ectogenesis and Ethical Theory, 12 J Appl Philos. 55 (1995).
88 Horn, supra note 35; Horn, supra note 56.
89 Elizabeth Chloe Romanis and Claire Horn, Artificial Wombs and the Ectogenesis Conversation: A Mis-
placed Focus? Technology, Abortion and Reproductive Freedom, 13 International Journal of Feminist
Approaches to Bioethics 174 (2020).
90 Kendal, supra note 22.
91 Montgomery v Lanarkshire, supra note 80.
92 Singer andWells, supra note 18, at 12.
93 Kendal, supra note 22, at 203.
94 E. C. Romanis, Regulating the ‘Brave New World:’ Ethico-Legal Implications of the Quest for Partial
Ectogenesis, (2020) (PhD Thesis, University of Manchester), at 40.
95 Dawn Johnsen,From Driving to Drugs: Governmental Regulation of Pregnant Women’s Lives After Webster, 138
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The process of opting for ectogestation and of having an abortion is hugely different
to the extent that they ought not be considered comparable in either experience or
effect. Most people who seek to end a pregnancy want to do so as quickly as possible.
Thevastmajority of abortions are carriedoutbefore13weeks’ gestation.96 At this point
in a pregnancy, the entity being gestated is undergoing the process of embryogenesis,
and as noted, there is no evidence that AAPT as currently conceptualized would be
capable of supporting a developing human entity in this process. Thus, a person could
not opt for AAPT in the same time frame that they could an abortion. Furthermore,
the usual process of ending a pregnancy before 13 weeks is early medical abortion—
the taking of twomedications (misoprostol andmifepristone) that inducemiscarriage.
The process of fetal extraction for AAPT would be major surgery,97 and therefore far
more invasive.98 The extent to which C-sections can have severe health implications
for people is not often emphasized in the ectogestation literature—these procedures
leave a permanent scar and involvemonths of recovery inwhich the abdominalmuscles
literally have to reform after the fascia that connects them is cut apart. Recovery can
be painful and slow. C-sections can sometimes prevent the person safely opting for
a vaginal delivery of a wanted pregnancy in future99 (which effectively denies the
person control over their body now and in potential future births). There also likely
would be severe psychological consequences where such invasive surgery feels forced
or coerced.100 Medical abortion and ‘extraction’ are not at all comparable in terms
of the impact on a person’s body, the potential side effects, the experience, and the
implications for a person’s conception of self. The same can also be said of surgical
abortion procedures, dilation, and extraction, which are still less invasive.101
Few scholars who question the permissibility of abortion in the advent of AAPT
take the vast differences in the procedures of abortion and fetal extraction to be
material. Stratman, for example, suggests that it is not clear that fetal extraction would
necessarily be more invasive or risky than abortion, claiming that ‘it is not incoherent
or implausible to think that fetal transfer would involve a surgery that is at least equally,
or perhaps, even less invasive and risky than current lethal forms of terminating one’s
pregnancy’.102 Blackshaw and Rodger assert that there can still be an obligation to
undergo fetal extraction even where it is ‘significantly worse than abortion, but not
that ‘fetuses are most accurately classified as tissues of human origin that are dependent on a pregnant
woman’s body for life, possessing varying statistical probabilities of becoming persons’, at 201.
96 82% of abortions in England and Wales are performed before 10 weeks: Department of Health, Abortion
Statistics, England and Wales 2019, https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/syste
m/uploads/attachment_data/file/891405/abortion-statistics-commentary-2019.pdf (accessed Feb. 10,
2021), 11; Romanis, supra note 73, at 344; Horn, supra note 35, at 173; Romanis and Horn, supra note
89, at 183.
97 This is discussed in detail later in this article.
98 Murphy, supra note 52, 34; Jackson, supra note 50, at 363; Alghrani, supra note 61, at 316–317; Romanis,
supra note 7, at 344.
99 Kathryn Fitzpatrick and others, Planned mode of delivery after previous caesarean section and short-term
maternal perinatal outcomes: A population based record linkage cohort study in Scotland, 16 PLoS Medicine
doi:10.1371 (2019).
100 Howard Minkoff and Lynn Paltrow, Melissa Rowland and the Rights of Pregnant Women, 104 Obstet.
Gynaecol. 1234, 1235 (2004).
101 This will be explored in detail later in this article.
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substantially worse’ because one can be required to assume some burdens to the self
to remove a fetus alive, rather than have an abortion.103 Within these arguments is an
abject failure to appreciate the monumental difference between abortion and both the
procedures outlined and the physical and emotional burdens in remaining pregnant for
the necessary additional time necessary to opt for AAPT.104
Furthermore, as Horn—who insists that a defense of abortion purely based on
bodily autonomy will always be lacking—explains, ‘even if removing a fetus to an
artificial womb could one day be made equivalent to consuming a pill, it is grossly
reductive to imagine that feminists would accept artificial wombs as an forced alter-
native to abortion’.105 Within the claim that there is an obligation to opt for AAPT,
there is also a failure to recognize that having individuals remain pregnant is a symbolic
assault in demeaning the value of that person to a mere fetal container and co-opting
their physicality for the benefit of another. Denying abortion ‘should be understood
as a serious symbolic assault on a woman’s sense of self precisely because it thwarts
the projection of bodily integration and places the woman’s body in the hands and
imaginings of others who would deny her coherence by separating her womb from
herself ’.106 Denying abortion effectively demeans those with the capacity to gestate
and birth to nothing more than that capacity to gestate and birth. Without abortion
available for post-conception prevention of pregnancy, people with female physiology
will be limited in their sexual freedom, and subject to the perception that their sexuality
is merely a facet of their ‘maternal destiny’. Contraceptive failure, irregular menstrual
cycle (leading to mistakes in estimating ovulation period), and other mistakes are not
uncommon; the problem is that the effects of these events are not unilaterally imposed
onpeoplewithout the capacity to gestate (usuallymen) like they are peoplewith female
physiology.
AAPT and abortion are also different in their nature and purpose. Kendal reiterates
that ectogestation ‘does not replace the role of abortion in reproductive healthcare, nor
is it functionally equivalent’.107 Stratman contends that there is no empirical evidence
that can be appealed to suggest that preventing a person from aborting a pregnancy
(instead forcing them to submit to fetal extraction) would lead to any concrete harms
just because it does not allow people to avoid biological parenthood.108 Feminist
literature, however, points ‘to the multiple individual, social and structural factors
that may lead a woman to seek an abortion, and affirm that abortion is not simply
reducible to a physical desire not to be pregnant’.109 Jackson observes that few pregnant
103 Blackshaw and Rodger, supra note 18, at 78.
104 Remaining pregnant (even earlier in pregnancy) means continuing to be occupied, and having the bound-
aries of one’s physical self-altered: Maggie Little, Abortion, Intimacy and the Duty to Gestate, 2 Ethical
TheoryMoral Pract 295, 301 (1999). It involves enduring hormonal changes that can change how you
think and feel, increasing fatigue that can alter what you feel capable of doing, and nausea that can prevent
you enjoying food and drink. These changes impact on every aspect of a person’s daily life.
105 Horn, supra note 56, at 5.
106 D. Cornell, the Imaginary Domain: Abortion, Pornography and Sexual Harrasment, 38
(Routledge, 1995), at 38.
107 Kendal, supra note 22, at 203.
108 Stratman, supra note 20.
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people seek abortionpurelywith theobjectiveof avoidingpregnancy and labor;110 they
often do so specifically to evade biological parenthood and the presumed intimacy of
motherhood that is inferred from gestation. Because of the strong association between
gestationand socialmotherhood inpregnantpeople,111 terminationofpregnancy is the
only way for many women to conclusively reject parenthood and to escape the socially
enforced feelings of stigma, guilt, and shame, which can last a lifetime, that result from
being forced to reproduce and become a biological parent.112 The way societal stigma
around parenting is constructed specifically and disproportionately affects people who
gestate and birth. This does amount to a substantial harm because the reality is that
forcing people who birth (namely women) to become biological parents has the effect
of limiting their autonomy substantially.
Where bioethicists attempt to argue that AAPT should be undertaken in place of
abortionwherepeoplewant to end their pregnancies they shouldbewilling to acknowl-
edge and better address the full extent of the physical (and symbolic) imposition they
are suggesting people undertake. Denying abortion prevents people who menstruate
fromusing abortion tomitigate theunfortunate realities of unwantedpregnancy in such
a manner that is necessary to afford them equality.
IV. GENETIC PROGENITORS AND ABORTION
Assuming the continued availability of abortion, howwould a conflict between genetic
progenitors about abortionbe resolved in light ofAAPT?The rights of ‘putative fathers’
to ‘have a say in the decisionwhether or not to abort an unwanted pregnancy’ continues
to emerge in the debate surrounding abortion.113 In the bioethical literature, there has
been renewed interest in the rights of genetic progenitors who do not gestate in light
of AAPT.
Räsänen makes explicit claims about why both genetic progenitors would need to
be involved in an abortion decision with AAPT available. He writes that ‘procreation is
a collective act involving two people; therefore, the biological father also has a right [to
be involved about decisions about whether to become a biological parent] . . . when it
is possible to gestate the fetus outside thewomb, the fate of the fetus is not her decision,
but their decision’.114 He bases this claim on the fact that both genetic progenitors
are entitled to make decisions about reproducing equally, that the fetus is both of
their property and the decision concerns both of their genetic privacy.115 Brassington
suggests that ‘parenthood is often described as a joint project . . . if something is a joint
project, then we can expect decisions be made either jointly or, if individually, only
within the confines of some jointly settled rubric’116 noting that abortion decisions
110 Jackson, supra note 50, at 362; this point is also noted by Cannold, supra note 87; Horn, supra note 35;
Romanis and Horn, supra note 89, at 184; Horn, supra note 56.
111 The personwho gestates is declared the legal mother at birth and this can only be abdicated through formal
legal processes. I will return to this point of parenthood being thrust upon people who gestate and birth
later in this paper when discussing abortion disputes specifically.
112 J. Robertson, Children of Choice; Freedom and the New Reproductive Technologies, 49
(Princeton University Press, 1990).
113 Fox, supra note 4, at 216.
114 Räsänen, supra note 10, at 699.
115 Id, at 99–701.
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are not undertaken on this basis now because a pregnant person’s bodily autonomy is
engaged. He stipulates that were ectogestation ‘to become a practical possibility, then
the right of themother unilaterally todecide to terminate thepregnancywouldnot have
to indicate the right of the mother unilaterally to act foeticidally. For the possibility
of in vitro gestation separates gestation from pregnancy’.117 He notes that his argu-
ment assumes that the non-foeticidal termination was as non-invasive as conventional
abortion for there to be a moral obligation,118 but if that were the case the gestating
person would have a responsibility to involve the other genetic progenitor in decisions
about abortion. Kennedy, while not advocating that genetic progenitors should have a
greater say in light of AAPT, still notes that the question of whether a ‘putative father’,
or even ‘some other individuals interested in becoming prospective parents may over-
ride’ a pregnant person’s wish to have an abortion and instead require them to submit
to fetal extraction, should be revisited.119 Stratman, while advocating that ectogesta-
tion renders abortion impermissible, suggests that if abortion were permissible then
any right to abortion would not be a collective right, because of the location of the
gestating entity when the decision is made.120 Kendal agrees, also citing the location
of the gestating entity.121 That the matter is increasingly being raised by bioethicists is
potentially unsurprising. Were this technology to come to fruition, this could become
a live issue.
‘Putative fathers’ have been clearly willing to ‘resort to law in an attempt to vindicate
their [perceived] interests’ in abortion decisions.122 This is evidenced in particular
by two high-profile legal challenges in the 70s and 80s that will be explored in this
article. There have been no new challenges in England andWales from putative fathers
for nearly two decades. However, it is likely that willingness to resort to law has not
evaporated asmuch as legal avenues appeared to be exhausted. In 1998, theUKSociety
for the Protection for Unborn Children claimed to receive up to six enquiries a week
frommenwhowished to prevent an abortion.123 They continue to campaign for ‘men’s
rights’ in abortion.
It is at least plausible that there might be renewed interest in the rights of genetic
progenitors who do not gestate in the abortion decision. The availability of AAPT
and the plausibility of partial ectogestation will increase the likelihood that a new
challenge is sought. It might be claimed that this technology significantly changes the
circumstances, such that the nature of the legal challenge that is brought is different
and thus has a greater chance of being successful. Earlier challenges were an attempt
to prevent the ending of a pregnancy.124 The challenge that might be brought with
AAPT is not that a pregnant person should be prevented from ending a pregnancy,
but that they might be prevented from ending their pregnancy in a particular way to
protect the interests of the other genetic progenitor. Thus, a new legal challenge might
117 Id, at 203.
118 Id, at 205.
119 SusanKennedy,Willing mothers: ectogenesis and the role of gestational motherhood,46 JMedEthics 320, 325
(2020).
120 Stratman, supra note 20.
121 Kendal, supra note 20, at 203.
122 Fox, supra note 4, at 200.
123 Nolan, supra note 3, at 220.
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be perceived by some lobbying organizations and/or individual genetic progenitors as
a chance to act. There are some ‘putative parents’ who are deeply committed to the
notion of protecting the life of a gestating human entity because they believe it is half
‘theirs’, a being they might grow very attached to, and that they may feel entitled to as
part of their ambitions for a family.125 I will use the following hypothetical scenario to
consider what an abortion challenge might look like and why it is likely to fail:
Abi and Brian have sexual intercourse and Abi becomes pregnant. She does not become aware
that she is pregnant until 18 weeks. She does not want to remain pregnant or become a parent,
so she seeks an abortion. Brian wants to become a parent and wants the fetus to be fully gestated
and is offering to raise the child himself. Two doctors agree that Abi satisfies s.1 (1)(a) of the AA
1967 and she has booked an appointment for treatment. Brian has sought legal advice because
he wants to prevent her abortion and instead have the fetus ‘extracted’ for partial ectogestation.
To obtain an injunction to prevent abortion, Brian must prove that a genetic pro-
genitor/putative parent has the locus standi to seek an injunction and that there are
grounds to grant such an injunction. I demonstrate that, on both counts, AAPT does
not improve the likelihood of genetic progenitors/putative parents being successful in
a challenge to prevent conventional abortion within the current legal framework.
V. LOCUS STANDI
While theOAPA1861 and the ILPA1929 afford the fetus someprotection, ‘English law
has consistently and unambiguously declared that a fetus has no rights or interests until
born’.126 Birth is thepointwhen it ‘attains the statusof a legal persona’.127 Consequently,
the fetus has no right of action until birth,128 because ‘to have a right the . . . [human
entity] must be born and be a child’.129 The fetus, then, has no rights that can be
enforced against others that can be relied upon to seek an injunction to prevent
abortion.130 Brian must therefore depend on his own ‘right’ to seek an injunction.
V. A. As a ‘Sufficiently Proximate Party’
In Paton v British Pregnancy Advisory Service,131 Mr Paton sought an injunction to
restrain hiswife fromhaving an abortionwithout his consent. She had already secured a
medical certificate enabling a legal abortionunder theAA1967.MrPaton accepted that
the provisions of the Act weremet such that her abortion was lawful.132 The judgment
centered on whether Mr Paton had the legal standing to obtain an injunction because
‘theremust be a legal right enforceable in lawor in equitybefore the applicant canobtain
an injunction from the court to restrain an infringement of that right’.133 His case was
125 J. KenyonMason, Abortion and the Law, in Legal Issues in Human Reproduction 58–59 (S. McLean,
eds, 1990).
126 ElizabethWicks,Terminating Life and Human Rights: The Fetus and the Neonate, in TheCriminal Justice
System andHealth Care, 197 (C. Erin and S. Ost, eds, 2017); Paton, supra note 26.
127 Re MB (An adult: medical treatment) [1997] 8Med LR 217.
128 Paton, supra note 26, at 279 per Baker P.
129 Id.
130 C v S, supra note 26.
131 Paton, supra note 26.
132 Id., at 278.
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deemed to rest on his status as the husband of the pregnant woman, because unmarried
fathers haveonly the rights conferredon themby statute and therewas, in 1979, no such
right in these circumstances.134 He was deemed unable to seek an injunction because
the AA 1967 granted husbands ‘no right . . . [which he might have enforced] to be
consulted in respect of termination of pregnancy’.135 English law is clear that a putative
‘father’136 does not have sufficient interest to seek an injunction just because they are
a genetic progenitor or because they are presumed to be the ‘putative father’ because
of their relationship to the ‘putative mother’.137 This conclusion was also supported in
the European Court of Human Rights.138
Nine years after Paton, Richard Carver sought an injunction to prevent his former
partner from obtaining an abortion. InC v S,139 MrCarver sought an injunction on the
grounds that he had a personal interest, though lesser than a legal right, in preventing
his former partner’s abortion because he submitted that abortion encompassed a crime
against his ‘unborn child’ under the ILPA 1929. The fetus was between 18- and 21-
weeks’ gestation. Carver argued it was thus ‘capable of being born alive’. The Court of
Appeal noted that if there had been merit in his claim of criminality they would have
given ‘very considerable thought’140 to the view expressed inPaton141 that a judgewho
sought to interfere with the discretion of doctors under the AA 1967 would be both
bold and foolish, ‘unless, possibly, where there is clear bad faith and an obvious attempt
to perpetrate a criminal offence’.142
This suggests that a genetic progenitor/putative parent can bring an injunction not
as ‘the father’, but as a secondary party with sufficient proximity to a harmed party.143
This would effectively be equivalent to allowing him to pursue guardianship over the
fetus by enabling him to intervene to protect its welfare. If this were to be accepted, it
seems that this ‘right as a proximate party’ to pursue an injunctionmight not be limited
to genetic progenitors or ‘putative fathers’. The Children Act 1989 (CA 1989), while
applying only to children that have been born (and thus not applying to fetuses),144
might be useful to briefly consider in that it illustrates the parties that are deemed prox-
imate to children in law. Therefore, it can illuminate, to some extent, the relationships
that are of merit to consider in context. Interestingly, in stipulating the parties that are
134 Id., at 279–280 per Baker P.
135 Id., at 281 per Baker P.
136 This term is used here as this is howMr Paton identified.
137 English common law presumes ‘pater est quem nuptiae demonstrant’ that is that the husband of a personwho
gives birth is the father of the child. This can be rebutted where it is established that he is not the biological
father—Family Law Reform Act 1969, s.26. The presumption therefore, is that a husband is the genetic
father unless firmly proven otherwise.
138 Paton v United Kingdom (1981) 3 EHRR 408.
139 C v S, supra note 26.
140 Id., at 153 per DonaldsonMR.
141 Paton, supra note 26.
142 Id., at 282 per Baker P.
143 Proximity is a concept deployed frequently in the law of torts to ascertain whether parties are sufficiently
close such that it is reasonably foreseeable that the actions of one party will cause damage or loss to the
other. See Caparo Industries v Dickman [1990] Ac 605, at 617 per Lord Bridge.
144 Noorder canbe sought in respectof a foetususing theChildrenAct1989or theCourt’s inherent jurisdiction
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‘proximate enough’ to a child to have contact or live with,145 the CA 1989 introduces a
hierarchy in relationships between different genetically related people to children. The
Act distinguishes between individuals who are deemed automatically entitled to apply
for contact with a child and those who need the leave of the Court to do so.146 This
distinction serves to signify that some relationships with children need no justification
as to proximity, whereas others must be proven.
A father of a born child,whethermarriedor un-married andwithorwithout parental
responsibility, is entitled, without seeing leave, to seek a Child Arrangement order.147
Another relative is entitled to do so, without seeking leave, if the child has lived with
them for 1 year preceding application.148 A relative with whom the child has not lived
for the requisite period can seek leave from the court to apply. ‘Relative’ is broadly
defined. It includes grandparents, siblings, and uncles and aunts whether by full or half-
blood or bymarriage or civil partnership.149 What this hierarchy in relationships serves
to illustrate is that the relationship a father has with a child is assumed byway of genetic
connection—it is not based on any level of relationship of care that actually exists and
can be evidenced. Other family members must always prove the significance of their
relationship in some way. Here, we should note then that, while other people who
might consider themselves ‘proximate’ to a fetus, for example a ‘putative grandparent’,
they are likely to find it much more difficult to establish their interest as a ‘proximate
party’. Again, I reiterate that the provisions in the CA 1989 cannot be used in disputes
concerning fetuses—but it is highlighted here to illustrate the deference towards a
genetic father’s interests. Furthermore, the Act demonstrates that the law not only
discriminates between relationships that are proximate on the grounds of genetics, but
on the basis of facts beyond that; it is ultimately grounded on the connections and
relationships between children and other persons, and so, it is not helpful in the context
of a gestating human entity.One of the primary differences between a fetus before birth
and a child after birth is its ‘natality’150 in that the born child is in the world in the
sense of coming ‘into the world with and as a specific body, and in a given place, set of
relationships, [and] situation in society’, essentially a child is usually interacting with a
broader range of others that it is dependent upon.
The law explicitly recognizes a relationship between a pregnant person and their
fetus after birth,151 but also during the course of a pregnancy.152 While a fetus is in
utero its existence is mediated through the pregnant person as it is not ‘in the world’,
in the sense that it does not have relationships with others.153 It is hard to imagine
how a claim that is substantiated on a ‘relationship’ with a fetus would be mounted,
never mind successfully. Thus, it is more likely that a person who considers themselves
145 For example, by way of a Child Arrangement Order: Children Act 1989, s.8 (1), as amended by Children
and Families Act 2014, s.12.
146 Id., s.10 (1) (a).
147 Id., s.10 (4) (a).
148 Id., s.10 (5B), as amended by Children and Young Persons Act 2008, s.36.
149 Id., s.105 (1) as amended by Civil Partnership Act 2004, s.75.
150 A Stone, Being Born: Birth and Philosophy, 3 (Oxford University Press, 2019).
151 It is determinative of legal motherhood: Ampthill Peerage Case [1977] Ac 547; at 577 per Lord Simon.
152 Re G (Residence: Same Sex Partner) [2006] Ukhl 43; M. Austin, Conceptions of Parenthood;
Ethics and the Family, 33 (Ashgate Publishing 2007) 33.
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a ‘putativeparent’might succeed relyingon the fact that they are the ‘genetic progenitor’
as opposed to ‘putative parent’. Logicwould seeminglydictate, therefore, that a ‘putative
father’ ismore likely to be able to substantiate the claim of a ‘relationship’ (based purely
on genetic connection) with a fetus than other relatives. The law already recognizes
that the genetic ‘father’ does not need to prove the ‘substance’ of his relationship
with their child,154 presumably based on a close genetic relationship and the social
emphasis placed on the value of biological kinship. Other parties, however, cannot rely
on their genetic relationship with a child, and thus they would have an even weaker
claim to a fetus. The genetic relationship between a genetic progenitor and a born
child is stronger, both literally and symbolically than that between a born child and
their grandparent or an aunt, for example. This is one way in which the analysis of the
CA 1989, though not applicable, was useful in illustrating this difference in degrees
of genetic relatedness and its relevance. An action to prevent an abortion impinges
on the pregnant person’s bodily autonomy; thus, there would and should be great
caution in expanding the category of who has the right to launch a challenge to their
abortion decision. There was some evidence of judicial sympathy toward the ‘plight’ of
the putative ‘father’ in Paton,155 in which it was noted that the ratio was the result of
‘applying the law free from emotion or predilection’.156 It is plausible that there might,
therefore, be some sympathy for a new argument that is consistent with the law of
England and Wales, granting putative fathers locus standi to seek an injunction. It is
hard to imagine the same sympathy to the claim of a ‘putative grandmother’ attempting
to prevent their child having an abortion. Though, in other jurisdictions there have
been instances of ‘putative grandparents’ winning the right to use their dead children’s
gametes to have a ‘grandchild’.157 This, of course, should be distinguished on the basis
that their use of gametewould not impinge on another person’s bodily autonomy in the
same way.
V. B. With ‘Something to Stand Against’
C v S158 seemingly indicates that a priori putative fathers have standing, qualified by the
condition that there is something to ‘stand against’. They have standing when they can
demonstrate that the fetus, to which they are sufficiently proximate, has been or will be
unlawfully wronged. Fox has suggested that if men succeeded ‘in linking their claims
to the welfare of their unborn children they would stand a better chance of success
before the courts’.159 C v S is a limiting precedent because the judgment determines that
abortion is not criminal in circumstances covering all ‘social abortions’160 under theAA
1967161 and when the pregnant person’s mental health may be gravely affected.162 It
154 J. Herring, Family Law, 544 (Pearson, 2019).
155 Fox, supra note 4, at 205.
156 Paton, supra note 26.
157 Georgia Everett, Woman uses dead son’s sperm for IVF grandchildren, https://www.bionews.org.uk/pa
ge_96375 (accessed Aug. 1, 2020).
158 C v S, supra note 26.
159 Fox, supra note 4, at 9.
160 Abortion Act, s.1 (1) (a), as amended by Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act, s.37.
161 As amended by Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act, s.37.
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was, however, observed that ‘every case depends on its own facts and circumstances’,163
consequently the possibilities of AAPT and partial ectogestation might be used to
distinguish a putative father’s argument from the judgment in C v S. Brian might be
able to prove that a doctor commits the offence of child destruction164 by providing
abortion where AAPT might enable its existence ex utero. This is dependent on the
interpretation of the ILPA 1929 and judicial engagement with medical evidence about
what it means to be ‘capable of being born alive’.
As explained, it is a criminal offence to, with the intention of so doing, kill a
fetus ‘capable of being born alive’.165 Whether it can be argued that the actus reus
is committed when Abi’s doctor performs an abortion is dependent on whether her
fetus is deemed ‘capable of being born alive’. A fetus of 24 weeks or more is prima
facie ‘capable of being born alive’.166 At 18 weeks, Abi’s fetus cannot be presumed to
be ‘capable’. Case law examining the meaning of ‘capable of being born alive’ centers
on the capacity to breathe, but is often described as inconsistent and irreconcilable.167
In C v S,168 it was unsuccessfully argued that a fetus between 18 and 21 weeks was
‘capable of being born alive’. While Sir John Donaldson MR did note that there were
significant and evident signs of fetal development at this point of gestation that had and
were taking place, he found that such a fetus was ‘incapable of breathing either naturally
or with the aid of a ventilator’,169 thus it was not subject to the protection of the ILPA
1929. Alghrani suggests that ‘viability [or being ‘capable of being born alive’] is an ever-
changing concept often dependent on the technology available and where in the world
one lives’.170 I have argued elsewhere that it is significant that the term ‘capable of being
born alive’ has not been explicitly defined by reference to a fixed gestational point, and
because of the judge’s willingness to entertain the suggestion that an 18 week fetus
might be capable of being born alive to the extent that medical evidence was heard on
thematter inC v S, it seems that ‘capableof beingborn alive’ is a rebuttablepresumption.
The law has left space for proof that a fetus could be born alive before 24 weeks.171
There are, therefore, questions about whether a fetus that was capable only of being
transferred to AAPT would be considered legally ‘capable of being born alive’.172 This
is a matter that a genetic progenitor/putative parent might seek to engage with in order
to establish they have locus standi. The argument might go as follows: Abi’s doctor
commits the offence of child destruction if they perform an abortion at 18 weeks
because Abi’s fetus could survive in an ectogestative device (AAPT). In performing the
abortion, the doctor would end the life of a fetus ‘capable of being born alive’ (because
it could be delivered from Abi and placed in an AAPT device) with the intention of
securing its death because the action taken was chosen specifically because it resulted
163 Id., at 148 per Heilbron J.
164 Infant Life (Preservation) Act, s.1 (1).
165 Id.
166 Abortion Act 1967, s.1 as amended by the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 1990, s.37.
167 Margot Brazier and John Harris, ‘Fetal Infants:’ At the Edge of Life, in Inspiring a Medico-Legal
Revolution; Essays in Honour of SheilaMclean, 61 (P Ferguson and G Laurie, eds, 2015).
168 C v S, supra note 26.
169 Id., at 151 per DonaldsonMR.
170 Alghrani, supra note 60, at 311.
171 Romanis, supra note 48.
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in fetal death. Thus, Brian has standing to seek an injunction to prevent this criminal
offence.
Elsewhere, I have explored the complexities of how ‘capable of being born alive’ is
interpreted with the advent of AAPT.173 Relying on the work of Greasley,174 I argued
that that the gestateling175 should not be considered born alive for the purposes of
the law because it has not made the adaptations to the external environment (for
example, moving from fetal to breathing physiology)176 that are associated with a
complete birth.177 Thus, although the gestateling is delivered from a pregnant person,
it is not ‘born alive’ because it has not emerged from the process of gestation, not
evidencing the relevant degree of self-sufficiency or interacting with others in the
external environment.178 Thus, if a gestateling is not ‘born alive’, but a fetus that is
capable of surviving ex utero only if placed in anAAPT-device that facilitates continued
(artificial) gestation then it is not ‘capable of being born alive’. It is suggested that
there is a meaningful developmental difference between a fetus no longer necessarily in
need of being created because it could survive after gestationwith conventional care and a
fetus that cannot be sustained outside of gestation.Thoughquestionable, if the state has an
interest in potential life, it seems intuitive that this interest would be directed only towards
those fetuses that could live in the external environment rather than those human entities
still dependent on being created (whether in utero or an ‘artificial womb’.)179
If we accept this interpretation of the ILPA 1929 and the definition of ‘capable of being
born alive’, it seems unlikely that Brian would be able to rely on Abi’s abortion being
a crime to establish he had locus standi. Furthermore, I note that the provisions of
the ILPA 1929 are not intended to criminalize doctors who provide safe abortions
within the parameters of the AA 1967,180 even if that fetus could survive with the
173 Romanis, supra note 73.
174 K. Greasley, Arguments About Abortion: Personhood, Morality and Law, 190–191 (Oxford
University Press, 2017).
175 The subject of the artificial placenta: Romanis, supra note 13, at 753.
176 Greasley, supra note 174, at 191.
177 Also see Romanis, supra note 48; Kingma and Finn, supra note 14.
178 Romanis, supra note 73, at 112.
179 Romanis, supra note 48.
180 There is explicitly a defense provided to the crime of child destruction for doctors who comply with the
conditions for providing termination in the AA 1967. Moreover, there is no evidence that the Act was
introduced to criminalize doctors providing abortion. The OAPA 1861 already criminalized ‘unlawful
miscarriage’—meaning abortion that carries a maximum term of life imprisonment. Thus, there was no
need to introduce a different offence. In R v Bourne [1939] 1 Kb 687, it was held that abortion performed
by a doctor was not an ‘unlawful’ procurement of miscarriage where the doctor deemed it necessary for the
purpose of preserving the pregnant person’s life. In this case, MacNaghten J stipulated that ‘if the doctor
is of the opinion, on reasonable grounds and with adequate knowledge, that the probable consequence of
the continuance of pregnancy will be to make the woman a physical or mental wreck, the jury are quite
entitled to take the view that the doctor who, under those circumstances and in that honest belief, operates,
is operating for the purpose of preserving the life of the mother’. This case merely affirmed the status
quo at the time—as even before this point (including in 1929) abortion was being routinely performed
by doctors for women who could afford their services without criminal consequences. See: J Keown,
Doctors Abortion and the Law, 79 (Cambridge University Press 1988); Sheldon supra note 67, at
80. The offence in the ILPA 1929 was specifically introduced to respond to the concern that some women
were in effect ‘escaping’ criminal sanctionwhere it couldnotbeproven that their foetuswasborn alivebefore
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aid of AAPT. Moreover, ‘Paton and C v S show the same reluctance on the behalf
of the judiciary to supervise the doctors [and] to second guess their decisions other
than in clear cases of bad faith or bad medical practice . . . ’181 If two doctors agree in
good faith that abortion is permissible, it is unlikely that the judiciary will challenge
this conclusion in a civil action. As Sheldon has observed, the courts have consistently
refused ‘to supervise . . . doctors’ discretion, beyond ensuring the existence of good
faith, [and thiswas] anextremely influential factor in establishing thatwomencannotbe
prevented from terminating a pregnancy by the opposition of their sexual partners’.182
Brian cannot establish he has sufficient standing to seek an injunction.
V. C. ‘Harm to a Fetus’
Several feminist scholars have noted other threats, beyond abortion challenges relying
on the ILPA 1929, to pregnant people’s autonomy resulting from the availability of
AAPT. There are concerns about what happens when a pregnant person is considered
a ‘sub-standard gestator’183 because of their behavior, and thus is pressured to opt
out of gestation in favor of AAPT.184 While this is a different matter to the primary
question at hand, it is interesting to consider here because this is another way in which
a putative parent/genetic progenitor might attempt to demonstrate they have locus
standi to interfere in abortion decisions without contending that abortion would be
criminal. Consider the following:
Cora is known to abuse alcohol. After having sexual intercourse with Daniel, she becomes
pregnant due to a failure of contraception. Cora wants to continue with her pregnancy and raise
the child. Daniel also wants the fetus to be fully gestated and to raise the child. He is concerned,
however, by Cora’s substance abuse and does not want any harm to come to the fetus. Cora is
now 18 weeks pregnant. Daniel wants to seek an injunction to prevent Cora from carrying the
pregnancy. He wants the fetus ‘extracted’ for partial ectogestation.
If Cora is abusing alcohol to excess, there is evidence to suggest this could cause serious
harm to her fetus, including FASD (fetal alcohol spectrum disorder).185 Based on the
logic earlier advanced in analyzing C v S,186 Daniel may be entitled to ‘stand against’
this harm if it can be shown to be unlawful. InA-G’s Reference (No 3 of 1994) theHouse
of Lords held that a person is guilty of manslaughter when their unlawful action injures
a fetus that is subsequently born alive before dying as a result of the injury.187 The
Child-Killing in English Law, 1 Mod. Law Rev 203 (1937); E. Milne, Criminal Justice Responses to
Maternal Filicide: Judging the FailedMother, (Emerald forthcoming).
181 Sheldon, supra note 67, at 90.
182 Id., at 103.
183 Giulia Cavaliere, Gestation, Equality and Freedom: Ectogenesis as a Political Perspective, 46 JMedEthics
76, 79 (2019).
184 Jackson, supra note 50, at 361; Cavaliere, supra note 183, at 79; Elizabeth Chloe Romanis and others,
Reviewing the Womb, J Med Ethics (2020) doi.org/10.1136/medethics-2020-106160.
185 It is important to note here that FASD is only likely with the excess consumption of alcohol during
pregnancy. There is limited evidence that there is a link between the consumption of any alcohol (as
opposed to the abuse of alcohol) could result in serious injury or impairment to a foetus. See: Betsy Thom
and others,Drinking in Pregnancy, in Risk andSubstanceAbuse, (SMacGregor andBThom, eds, 2020).
186 C v S, supra note 26.
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judgment didnot excludepregnant people; thus, there remains thepossibility thatCora
could be guilty of gross negligencemanslaughter if her fetus is born alive before dying as
a result of her alcohol consumptionduringpregnancy.188 Furthermore, LordMustill, in
obiter, suggested that ‘harm short of death’might give rise to criminal liability.However,
the fetus cannot be a victim of a crime if the actus reus of that crime specifies that the
harm is inflicted on ‘any other person’ because it has no legal persona.189 The homicide
offences are an exception because there can be a time lag between the guilty action and
resulting deathwithout precluding responsibility,190 inwhich time the fetus is born and
becomes a person that can be a victimof homicide.CP v Criminal Injuries Compensation
Authority effectively closed the door on Lord Mustill’s obiter suggestion. It was held
that a pregnant person cannot inflict the actus reus of grievous bodily harm on their
fetus. There is no time discrepancy in the offence; the harm is inflicted at the point
of guilty action191 and the fetus cannot be considered a victim of that harm. Daniel
must, therefore, establish that the fetus would become the victim of gross negligence
manslaughter, which is an unlawful action that, if Daniel is sufficiently proximate to, he
might be entitled to ‘stand against’. Although Daniel can demonstrate that there would
be some potential infliction of injury to the fetus, he simply cannot demonstrate that
this is actionable harm.There are toomanyexternal factors, including structural factors,
such as access to prenatal care and circumstances of birth (to name a few), whichmight
determinewhether the fetus is born and thenwould subsequently die such that it could
become a victim of manslaughter (as the death would have to be after birth).192
The Criminal Law Act 1967 empowers persons to use reasonable force to prevent
the commission of a crime.193 Daniel might attempt to argue that he has standing to
interfere withCora’s choices in pregnancy because he is entitled to use reasonable force
to prevent the commission of a crime.However, even ifDaniel literally encountersCora
drinking from a vodka bottle, he cannot establish that gross negligence manslaughter
is being committed. He cannot be certain that the fetus is sustaining any damage from
what he witnesses nor that the fetus will be born alive only to subsequently die because
of what he witnesses. The Criminal Law Act 1967 only applies when the intervening
party is preventing a crime. The best Daniel can ascertain is that there is a risk or
a chance that a crime is being committed, which is insufficient. There would also
be difficulty, as will be discussed, in establishing that intervention amounted only to
reasonable force.
The locus standi of a putative parent/genetic progenitor is dependent on whether
they can substantiate that a crimemight be committed against the fetus. It is interesting
that their claim does not actually appear to be substantiated in any way based on
their genetic relationship to the fetus that they might perceive to be putative parent
of. Such locus standi could only be established with an amendment to the AA 1967,
requiring that genetic progenitors be consulted. There was no political capital for such
an amendment following Paton and C v S; however, the development of AAPT might
188 Brazier and Cave, supra note 25, at 346.
189 CP (A Child) v Criminal Injuries Compensation Authority [2015] QB 459.
190 Id., at 472 per Treacy LJ.
191 Id.
192 A-G’s Ref, supra note 187.
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provide sufficient clout to the claims of putative fathers and anti-abortion campaigns.
It remains unlikely, however, that Parliament would amend legislation in amanner that
is, and would be perceived as, a blatant disregard of pregnant people’s rights without a
critical mass of support. It is the case, however, that bills of this nature (for example
requiring spousal consent for abortion) are not infrequently debated in the United
States.194
Let us assume, however, that the law is changed or that a crime can be proven.
NeitherPatonnorC v S consideredwhether a putative father could obtain an injunction
to prevent abortion beyond considering locus standi because both actions failed at this
point. For thoroughness, however, I will consider such a claim by returning to Abi and
Brian. This is, of course, purely an ‘academic question’.195
VI. PUTATIVE PARENTS AND ABORTION INJUNCTIONS
Even assuming he has standing, Brian remains unlikely to obtain an injunction against
Abi to prevent her accessing abortion. In this following section, I explain that this is
a result of the pregnant person’s legal right to self-determination, and to not become a
parent. Before doing so, it is important to note the gendered dimension of thePaton and
C v S disputes. These cases were not just about genetic progenitors trying to interfere
with a pregnant person’s choices (though I am using them to discuss this matter in this
article). They were specifically instances of men trying to control women’s bodies. Fox
has suggested that, andmany like them, are ‘a punitive and vindictive assertion of rights
through law, [that are specifically about controllingwomen andwomen’s bodies] rather
than an effort to secure justice’.196 The very ‘staking of claims by putative fathers speaks
volumes about contemporary female/male relations especially over women’s fertility
and their power to control it’.197 This is something that might be particularly pertinent
in some aspects of disputes as stressed earlier in this article. For example, until we have
more equitable division of childrearing in society and we stop placing excess pressure
on women to mother, there will continue to be pressing reasons to prioritize women’s
preferences about (not) parenting.
VI. A. Self-Determination and Pregnancy
Some scholars, such as Smajdor198 and MacKay,199 frame the liberating potential in
ectogestation as its ability to enable female people to ‘reproduce as [males] do’.200
Gelfand posits that ectogestation introduces the future possibility that one day ‘a
194 For example, there was an attempt in Ohio in 2007. These laws are debated despite the fact that the US
Supreme Court has before held spousal consent laws to be unconstitutional because they would interfere
with a pregnant person’s right to privacyPlanned Parenthood v Danforth, 428U.S. 52 (UnitedStates Supreme
Court).
195 As the matter was described in Paton, supra note 26, at 281 per Baker P.
196 Marie Fox, A Woman’s Right to Choose? A Feminist Critique, in The Future of Human Reproduction:
Ethics, Choice and Regulation, 90 (J. Harris and S. Holm, eds, 1998).
197 Id., at 89.
198 Anna Smajdor, The Moral Imperative for Ectogenesis, 16 Camb qHealthc Ethics 336, 337 (2007).
199 Kathryn McKay, The ‘tyranny of reproduction:’ Could ectogenesis further women’s liberation? 34 Bioethics
346, 351 (2020).
200 For a critique of the ‘ideal of assimilation’—see Giulia Cavaliere, Ectogenesis and gender-based oppression:
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[female person’s] contribution to the birth of a live babywill be similar to that of a [male
person] . . . each will only need to provide or donate gametes’.201 However, complete
ectogestation, whichmight enable the kind of reproduction thatGelfand imagines is far
less imminent a possibility than partial ectogestation.202 Partial ectogestation will still
involve a greater contribution from a person who undertakes some period of gestation.
The fetus is still partially gestated in a person’s womb for a period of pregnancy until
it can be safely extracted for transfer to AAPT. Any debate about what the advent of
AAPT means for abortion provision will always be about partial ectogestation: since
abortion is the ending of a pregnancy that inevitably involves a person’s body.203 This
is a fact that the literature on ectogestation often does not center appropriately.
As noted earlier, for transfer to AAPT, a process of ‘fetal extraction’ resembling a
more complex caesarean section would have to be undertaken. Earlier in pregnancy,
this is much riskier and much more likely to cause serious damage to the pregnant
person’s body. Comparatively, risks associated with forms of abortion are much lower
depending on the stage of the pregnancy. This is particularly the case before 10 weeks’
gestation when medical abortion is routine—the risks associated with this procedure
are minimal. There are small risks of excessive bleeding and permanent damage to the
cervix or womb that becomemore substantial as pregnancy progresses.204 These risks
are still not in anyway comparable to those associatedwith ‘fetal extraction’. Obviously,
at 18 weeks, Abi is beyond the gestational limit for early medical abortion,205 and so
would have to undergo a surgical procedure.206 While this will still involve the risks of
undergoing general anesthesia (though not always),207 and some other potential risks
such as pain, injury to the cervix and infection,208 these are much less likely209 and
much less serious than those associatedwith a caesarean section. Surgical abortions are
considered so routine that most people do not have to stay a night in hospital.210 This
again is not comparable to a ‘fetal extraction for AAPT’ procedure.
The injunctions sought in Paton and C v S were to prevent abortion, thus resulting
in the pregnant person enduring an unwanted pregnancy to term with likely severe
201 Scott Gelfand, Ectogenesis and the Ethics of Care, in Ectogenesis: Artificial Womb Technology and
theFutureofHumanReproduction, 89 (S.Gelfand and J. Shook, eds, 2006); while not the subject of
this article, I note here that even if bothmale and female progenitors only have to produce gametes in order
to have a biological child that can be entirely gestated ex utero, there is a substantial difference in terms
of labor in the donation of gametes between males and females. The process of extracting oocytes from a
female person is far more invasive and involves a course of hormone treatment over a period of time. To
obtain sperm from a male they merely need to ejaculate.
202 Romanis, supra note 94, at 28–32.
203 Id., at 40.
204 National Health Service, Abortion; Risks, http://www.nhs.uk/Conditions/Abortion/Pages/Risks.aspx
(accessed Aug. 4, 2020).
205 See supra note 79.
206 After 14 weeks the form of surgical abortion necessary would be a dilation and evacuation procedure. See
See British Pregnancy Advisory Service, Dilation and Evacuation, https://www.bpas.org/abortion-care/a
bortion-treatments/surgical-abortion/dilatation-and-evacuation/ (accessed Aug 4, 2020).
207 Sometimes the procedure can be performed under a local anesthetic.
208 British Pregnancy Advisory Service, supra note 206.
209 A 2002 study found that the likelihood of complications after D&E occurred in approximately only 4% of
cases: See Amy Autry and others, A comparison of medical induction and dilation and evacuation for second-
trimester abortion, 187 Am. J. Obstet. Gynecol. 393 (2002).
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consequences for their physical and mental health if this had been required. Any
injunctions sought to prevent abortion in favor of AAPTwould be, in some ways, even
more invasive and onerous on pregnant people. Forcing a pregnant person to choose
between continued pregnancy and AAPT places them in an impossible situation in
which they are forced to either endure unwanted pregnancy (to be occupied and in
a state of forced physical intimacy and to have the boundaries of one’s self altered)211
or are forced to undergo a specific type of termination, which is dangerous, difficult and
would inevitably have a lasting impact on their physical and mental health.212 Such an
injunction inevitably would cross the boundaries of the pregnant person’s self and deny
them any individuation, bodily integrity, and autonomy.
Once twodoctors have agreed that a pregnant person satisfies one of the grounds for
legal termination,whether they thendecide to undergo ‘fetal extraction’, have a ‘conven-
tional abortion’ or continue with their pregnancy is their decision. A pregnant person
canprovideor refuse their consent for eachprocedure accordingly.213 Bodily autonomy
is afforded great respect in law. In the medico-legal sphere ‘the fundamental principle,
plain and incontestable is that every person’s body is inviolate’.214 This confers on ‘an
adult patient who . . . suffers from nomental incapacity . . . [the] . . . absolute right to
choose whether to consent to medical treatment, to refuse it, or to choose one rather
than another of the treatments being offered’215 even if their reasoning is ‘irrational,
unknown or non-existent’.216 Any procedure or treatment performed on a patient with
capacity,217 without their consent, violates their autonomy and is a criminal assault218
and a civil battery.219
Jackson notes that often, in practice, a pregnant person’s ‘decision to terminate a
pregnancy is frequently made in consultation with’ the other genetic progenitor.220
When there is a dispute, however, genetic progenitors that do not gestate are not legally
entitled to participate in decisions about the pregnant person’s medical treatment
during their pregnancy. This would violate the legal principle of self-determination
outlined. A person’s right to choose what happens to their body is not diminished by
circumstances; this applies equally to pregnant persons.McDonnell notes that ‘though
it is hoped that [a pregnant person] would give full and honest consideration inmaking
her decision’221 to the circumstances, including thewishes of other genetic progenitors,
211 Little, supra note 104, at 301.
212 C. Kaczor, the Edge of Life: Human Dignity and Contemporary Bioethics, Philosophy and
Medicine, 108 (Springer 2005).
213 Re T, supra note 78, at 102 per Lord Donaldson.
214 Collins v Wilcock [1984] 1WLR 1172, at 1177 per Lord Goff.
215 Re T, supra note 78, at 102 per Lord Donaldson.
216 Id. (emphasis added). Lots of challenges that are frequently raised to abortiondecisions claim that a person’s
reasons are not ‘good enough’, but the law does not usually require that people have a reason for choosing
to access healthcare or to refuse it. This is one of the problems with the law on abortion as it is currently
constructed. See Jackson, supra note 66.
217 As defined byMental Capacity Act 2005, s.3.
218 R v Tabassum [2000] 2 Cr App R 328.
219 B v An NHS Trust [2002] EWHC 429 (Fam).
220 Jackson, supra note 69, at 83.
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the desires of others have no effect on their right to bodily autonomy, and thus theyhave
no bearing on their right to make the choice to terminate a pregnancy.
In Re S,222 a C-section was ordered against a pregnant woman’s wishes, relying
on obiter from Re T that the principle of self-determination supersedes life except
when it may ‘lead to the death of a viable fetus’.223 The Re S decision has since been
criticized and overruled. In Re MB224 and St George’s v S,225 two cases concerning the
legality of performing a C-section without consent, the Court of Appeal held that a C-
section can never take place legally when the pregnant person has capacity but refuses
to consent, except where theMentalHealth Act 1983 is applicable,226 because it would
violate their ability to self-determine.227 A competent pregnant person is entitled to
refuse a C-section even when it would preserve the life of the fetus.228 An injunction
cannot be awarded to a putative father mandating that if a pregnant person wants
to terminate their pregnancy they must submit to an ‘invasive C-Section’ for AAPT
transfer without this constituting an enormous interference with the pregnant person’s
right to bodily autonomy in contentionwith the common law. Furthermore, ‘it is clearly
wrong that any third party should be able to come between a woman and her medical
advisers . . . ’229 Therewould also be an uncomfortable confidentiality issue that would
arise, if it were accepted that a non-gestational genetic progenitor did have a say in the
abortion decision, in the event that a doctor was unsure whether the other genetic
progenitor knew about the pregnancy.230 There could also be a practical issue here
too in considering what steps would be considered reasonable in attempting to contact
and consult non-gestational genetic progenitors, and what onus might be placed on
pregnant people in this process.
The right to protection from bodily violation means that ‘achieving reproductive
ends does not justify subjecting [pregnant people]’231 to procedures to which they
do not consent. An injunction that allowed a genetic progenitor to interfere in the
222 Re S (Adult: refusal of medical treatment) [1993] Fam 123.
223 Re T, supra note 78, at 102 per Lord Donaldson.
224 Re MB, supra note 127.
225 St George’s Healthcare NHS Trust v S [1998] 3WLR 936.
226 Tameside and Glossop Acute Services Trust v Ch (A Patient) [1996]FCR753;MentalHealthAct 1983, s.63—
though St George’s v S, supra note 225 evidenced a retreat from this approach.
227 Jonathan Herring, Compelling Caesarean Sections,Christian Law Review 43, 46 (1999).
228 Though this article limits its scope to considering cases of legally competent pregnant people it is important
to note that incompetent pregnant people are equally entitled to refuse unless it can be established that
overriding refusal is in the person’s best interests according to s.1(5) of the Mental Capacity Act 2005.
It would have to be proven that it was in their best interests to have their pregnancy end, but without
resulting in fetal death and that the difficult process in AAPT transfer would promote their welfare. The
interests of the foetus would have no bearing on the best interest’s decision following Re MB, supra note
127, at para 78 per Butler-Sloss LJ. It is clear that in determining whether it is in the best interests of a
person for their pregnancy to be terminated the court will pay close attention, per s. 4 (6)(a) of theMental
Capacity Act 2005, to the pregnant person’s ‘past and present wishes and feelings’ about pregnancy. See Re
AB (Termination of Pregnancy) [2019]EwcaCiv1215. Balancing the various factors related to the pregnant
person’s best interests would be a fact specific and difficult task, and it is beyond the scope of this article.
229 Mason, supra note 125, 59–60.
230 I amgrateful toAnnaNelson for raising this point in discussions. It should also be noted here that thismight
be of particular concern in caseswhere the pregnant person is the victimof rape, incest or in a violent and/or
abusive relationship and has reasons related to their safety for not disclosing their pregnancy to others or
specifically to their abuser who may be the other genetic progenitor of the pregnancy.
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abortion decision coerces pregnant people into making a ‘false choice’ between two
extreme forms of bodily interference. Being forced to undergo a C-section to enable
AAPT transfer to end a pregnancy would arguably be a form of degrading treatment,
prohibited by the European Convention of Human Rights (ECHR). Degrading treat-
ment is that which instigates fear, anguish, and feelings of inferiority that humiliates
and breaks the moral or physical resistance of the victim.232 A forced C-section is
invasive and involves the forced administration of anesthetics and potentially physical
restraints. It would carry significant risks and potentially leave the pregnant person
physically and mentally scarred. It appears conclusive that the courts will not force a
competent pregnant person to undergo any intervention for the benefit of a fetus. In
practice, the right to refuse intervention is often challenged. We can see this evidenced
in the excess deference to medical opinion and technology in the ‘forced caesarean’
cases.233 It is often difficult for people to freely refuse interventions in labor,234 as
although the principles of bodily autonomy are often reiterated and highlighted in
these cases, in practice they ‘reinforce a curious notion that the [very] conditions of
pregnancy and childbirth impact on a person’s capacity to consent’.235 These cases can
be distinguished from the specific matter at hand, in that there is reason to believe
that birthing people are vulnerable to findings of incapacity, and thus to having their
autonomous preferences disregarded, in the caesarean cases because they potentially
are in an emergency circumstance. However, these cases are important to highlight
here to demonstrate that choices that do not defer to obstetric recommendations—
often that can be made on the basis of the benefit of the ‘fetus’—are often treated with
suspicion and challenged.
A genetic progenitorwho attempts to prove that a crimemay be committed against a
fetus is making a claim to guardianship of an unborn fetus. They are effectively seeking
the ability to prevent ‘conventional abortion’ to protect fetal welfare. English law is
clear that interventions of this nature cannot be made;236 however, necessary they
may appear.237 In Re F,238 a local authority sought to ensure that a pregnant woman
compliedwith certain conditions toprotect fetalwelfare.Theywished tomake the fetus
award of court to ensure it was adequately protected. This is directly analogous, though
the injunction sought by Brian is evenmore onerous than the terms sought by the local
authority in Re F,239 which makes the reasoning even more compelling.
If the fetus were a ward of court, its interests would be paramount, because of how
‘child protection’ is prioritized in the exercise of the inherent jurisdiction240 resulting
in a pregnant person being forced to forfeit all their basic freedoms.241 This cannot
be condoned242 because it would result in the complete degradation of a pregnant
232 Ireland v United Kingdom [1978] ECHR 1.
233 E.g. Re MB, supra note 127.
234 Jackson, supra note 69, at 135.
235 Reference under review.
236 Re F, supra note 144.
237 Id., at 145 per Staughton LJ.
238 Id.
239 The Local Authority sought to ensure she remained in hospital until she had given birth.
240 Children Act 1989, s.1 (1).
241 Re F, supra note 144, 135 per May LJ.
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person. Ensuring pregnant people complied with the terms of an injunction would
be difficult because the Court could not ‘consider with any equanimity that . . . [the
guardian] should seek to enforce an order [using force or] by committal’.243 In Paton,
it was observed that an injunction would be ineffectual, because ‘no judge could even
consider sending a . . . wife to prison . . . [for ignoring the terms of this injunction].
That of itself, seems to cover the application here; this husband cannot stop his wife by
injunction from having what is . . . a lawful abortion’.244
AsHorn argues, it is imperative, for pregnant people’s health, that the right to access
abortion is maintained—even with the advent of this technology.245 Many pregnant
people are incentivized, driven by their desire not to become biological and/or social
mothers, to seek ‘back-street’ abortions, carried out by persons with no expertise, at
great personal risk to themselves and the fetus should it survive.246 The ‘misery and
injury resulting from unhygienic, risky, and illegal abortions’ that was curtailed by
the AA 1967247 could rear its ugly head once more (though it is unlikely that with
the advent of medication abortion this would have the same health consequences for
pregnant people as ‘clandestine’ abortions in the past) if limitations are placed on access
because of AAPT248 despite the fact that abortion is safe and abortion is healthcare.
VI. B. The Right to vs. the Right not to Procreate
It is unlikely that we will ever live in a world where AAPT would not be more invasive
than early ‘conventional abortion’. Early medical abortion is safe, satisfactory to service
users and enables a person to quickly secure freedom from unwanted pregnancy—
greatly benefiting their physical andmental health.249 The reasoning above related to a
person’s right to bodily integrity and autonomy, therefore, will always apply to abortion
decisions. This is a point that has been conceded by some, though not all,250 who
have examined the abortion decision in light of ectogestation.251 For the purposes of
examining the claims of putative parental rights that have been advanced in relation to
an abortion decision that does not engage a pregnant person’s bodily autonomy, I will
consider a hypothetical scenario. However, it is important to emphasize that this is a
constructed imaginary and we ought not to decenter claims about pregnant people’s
bodies, for the reasons outlined above and earlier in this article.
There are two abortion pills; neither is more invasive nor has more side effects than the other; but
one results in fetal death, and the other in the fetus being safely yet miraculously teleported alive
into an AAPT device. The ‘magic pill’ can secure freedom from pregnancy, safely preserve fetal
life during transfer to AAPT, and is no more invasive than ‘conventional abortion’. Abi wants
243 Id.
244 Paton, supra note 26, at 280 per Baker P.
245 Horn, supra note 56, at 9–10.
246 Jackson, supra note 69, at 72; Jackson, supra note 50, at 363.
247 Brazier and Cave, supra note 25, at 403.
248 Jackson, supra note 50, at 363.
249 Tamara Hervey and Sally Sheldon, Abortion by telemedicine in the European Union, 145 Int. J. Gynecol.
Obstet 125, 126 (2018).
250 Blackshaw and Rodger, supra note 18, at 78.
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to take the abortion pill that ensures fetal death; Brian wants her to take the pill that enables
‘miraculous transfer’ to AAPT. 252
There is only now scope for argumentation about putative parental rights associated
with being a genetic progenitor. Abortion is not considered to be only about ‘end-
ing pregnancy;’253 the ‘right to abortion’ is often interpreted as a ‘right to abdicate
genetic parenthood’.254 Where a genetic progenitor is seeking to prevent abortion, their
claimed right to be a parent will be in direct contention with an unwilling pregnant
person’s right to not be a parent. Alghrani posits that, to comprehend how such a
conflict might be resolved, it would be useful to consider how disputes that concern
the disposition of human embryos have been resolved since there are some obvious
parallels.255 In Evans v Amicus Health Care,256 Ms Evans, following the discovery of
cancer in both her ovaries, had her oocytes removed and fertilized with her then fiancé
Mr Johnson’s sperm to create embryos for storage. After her ovaries were removed, but
before IVF treatmentbegan,MsEvans andMr Johnson’s relationship ended. She sought
to use the embryos, created with both of their consent, to become pregnant and he
sought to remove his consent for the storage and use of the embryos.
Ms Evans claimed that either the Court of Appeal should interpret the provisions
of the Human Fertilization and Embryology Act 1990 (HFEA 1990) as compatible
with her right to family life, contained in the ECHR,257 or if impossible they must
grant a declaration of incompatibility.258 It was held, however, that the Act could in
no way be read as allowing Ms Evans to continue fertility treatment with the embryos
without Mr Johnson’s consent.259 It was accepted that denying Ms Evans use of the
embryos engaged her right to family life.260 However, the right to family life is not
absolute. Strasbourg jurisprudence allows derogation from respect for family life when
in accordance with the law, necessary in a democratic society for the protection of the
rights and freedoms of others and is proportionate.261 Mr Johnson claimed that the
engagement of Ms Evans’ right was necessary to protect his rights and freedoms, and
that the interference was proportionate. Arden LJ stated that it ‘would be difficult for a
court to judge whether the effect of the withdrawal of consent for Ms Evans is greater
than the effect that the invalidation of that withdrawal of consent for Mr Johnston’.262
Interferencewith her rights could not be justifiedbecause itwas necessary to protect his
rights, or vice versa, because both rights are qualified in the samewayby the rights of the
252 Part of the purpose of outlining this scenario is to illustrate quite how non-sensical claims that the bodily
integrity of the pregnant person is not engaged when AAPT is available (because pregnancy is ended) are.
253 Alghrani, supra note 60, at 314.
254 B. AlvarezManninen, Pro-Life, Pro-Choice: Shared Values in the AbortionDebate, 169–170
(Vanderbilt University Press 2014).
255 Alghrani, supra note 60, at 324.
256 Evans v Amicus Health Care Ltd and Others [2004] EWCA (Civ) 727.
257 European Convention of Human Rights, Article 8 (1).
258 Human Rights Act 1998, s.4 (2); Evans v Amicus Health Care, supra note 256, at para 58 per Thorpe LJ.
259 Id., at para 58 per Thorpe LJ.
260 Id., at para 108 per Arden LJ.
261 European Convention of Human Rights, Article 8 (2).
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other.263 The right to and not to procreate are, in theory, corresponding and equal.264
Thorpe LJ stressed that Parliament, therefore, had a choice between two legitimate
and proportionate options, each interfering withMs Evans’ or Mr Johnson’s respective
right to family life. Parliament having made a choice meant the court had no power of
intervention.265 The Court of Appeal held that Mr Johnson was able to withdraw his
consent for the use and storage of embryos created using his sperm266 as was expressly
provided by the HFEA 1990. This was deemed a proportionate interference with Ms
Evans’ right to family life.
Ms Evans appealed to the EuropeanCourt of HumanRights. A five-to-twomajority
found that the interference withMs Evans’ right to family life was within the margin of
appreciation.267 The State was entitled to balance private interests, such as competing
rights to family life, involved in the regulation of IVF treatment.268 Parliament could
have chosen to prioritize Ms Evans’ right, but deciding to prioritize Mr Johnson’s right
was also proportionate.269 Thus, the embryoswere destroyed andMsEvanswas unable
to have any genetic offspring. TheHFEA1990, and this interpretation of it, is clear that,
inEnglish law, the right not toprocreate is seemingly stronger than the right toprocreate
when reproduction is technologically assisted.
In our imagined dispute, Abi is attempting to enact her right not to reproduce, an
element of the right to family life,270 and Brian wishes to assert his right to reproduce,
another element of the right to family life. If—we imagine—that ‘fetal extraction’ for
AAPT is no more risky or invasive than abortion, Abi and Brian’s rights regarding
procreation are corresponding and equal, one will inevitably infringe on the right of
the other, and there is no specific legislation, unlike inEvans, to determine the outcome.
We must determine which right is stronger because without pregnancy or an invasive
procedure to end it, it has been suggested that male and female genetic progenitors or
‘men andwomen stand on equal ground’,271 because they are, as noted by the Supreme
Court of Tennessee, ‘entirely equivalent gamete providers’.272 Therefore, just as in an
embryo dispute, it might be argued that ‘none of the concerns about a woman’s bodily
integrity that have previously precludedmen from controlling abortion decisions [are]
applicable here’.273
The Evans judgment is distinguishable from Abi and Brian’s dispute because it
involved frozen embryos, which are, undeniably, different entities from fetuses. Black-
shaw andRodger stipulate that arguing about the right not to be a parent in the abortion
context is framed wrongly, because a person is already a biological parent once a fetus
is being gestated.274 Brassington also suggests that ‘one is no less a parent for the fetus
263 Id.
264 Id.
265 Id., at para 63 per Thorpe LJ.
266 Id., at para 41.
267 Evans v United Kingdom [2007] 42 Ehrr 21, at paras 59 and 62.
268 Id., at para 62.
269 Id., at para 68.
270 Evans v Amicus Health Care, supra note 256.
271 Bard, supra note 5, at 153.
272 Id.
273 Davis v Davis, 84 S.W. 2d 588 (1992) (Supreme Court of Tennessee); Bard, supra note 5, at 153.
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not having been born yet’.275 This conceptualization overstates the significance of a
fetus given that it has not yet been born.276 Kendal observes that, ‘the provision of
life-sustaining gestational processes gives the pregnant woman the ability to bestow
meaning onto the existence of the fetus, eg to bring it into relationship with others’.277
Therefore, it is only the pregnant person that can determine whether the fetus is
conceptualized by others as a ‘future family member’ or a bundle of cells.278 I would
go further, however, and suggest that while aspects of gestation are relational, and a
pregnant person who carries a pregnancy to term may consider themselves to have
some caring responsibilities, it would be inaccurate to claim that either they or other
genetic progenitors are parents before a child is born. Before birth, there is no subject
of which a genetic progenitor can be legally recognized as a parent. More importantly,
to describe a person as a parent is to imply the existence of a particular type of
relationship—as ‘the status of parent is relational status, to be a parent is not due to
any intrinsic features or qualities of a person. Rather, to be a parent depends on having
children of one’s own, and is therefore dependent on standing in relation with another,
where that other is the child’.279 Thus Singh, persuasively, indicates that newborns, and
not fetuses, can be the proper object of parental responsibilities.280 The relationship a
pregnant person has towards a fetus can also be distinguished from those we associated
with ‘parenting’,281 and it would be inappropriate to force thinking about ‘pregnancy as
parenting’ on a pregnant person.
In terms of the intrinsic properties of the fetus compared to the embryo—the law
does afford fetuses some protections that are not applicable to frozen embryos (for
example, legally speaking, there must be one of a set of ‘defined reasons’ to terminate
a fetus, but there need not be any reason given for the destruction of an embryo)—
however, the limited protections that are afforded to a fetus remain subordinate to a
pregnant person’s rights and health.282 A fetus can be terminated and it is not a legal
person. At 18 weeks’ gestation (thinking again of Abi’s fetus), there is little material
difference for the purposes of the imagined dispute between a frozen embryo as in
the Evans case in legal terms, even if there were any moral difference between the two
entities. This is because at 18 weeks the fetus can be aborted under s.1(1)(a) of the AA
1967.
Significantly, this is not Brian’s last opportunity to become a biological parent. The
dissenting judges in the ECHR were sympathetic283 to Ms Evans’ claim, because the
embryos literally were her last chance to have genetic offspring. Unless circumstances
have changed in the 18 weeks since the conception of the fetus, then Abi having an
abortion ‘has not robbed . . . [Brian] of the general capacity to procreate; rather . . .
[Abi] has denied him the opportunity to become a father to a specific child’.284 The
275 Brassington, supra note 10, at 199.
276 Romanis, supra note 48.
277 Kendal, supra note 22, at 201
278 Id.
279 Prabhpal Singh, Fetuses, newborns & parental responsibility, 46 J. Med Ethics 188 (2020), at 190.
280 Id., at 190.
281 Id., at 190.
282 Abortion Act 1967; Infant Life (Preservation) Act 1929.
283 The majority also expressed sympathy; Evans v United Kingdom, supra note 267, at para 67.
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infringement with Brian’s right to family life is minor, because while he is denied
fatherhood of this particular entity, he is not prevented frombecoming a genetic parent
in lots of other circumstances. Whereas Abi’s freedom, if she had genetic parenthood
forced upon her, ‘may be inhibited by feelings of guilt or even responsibility’, resulting
from the knowledge that her child exists elsewhere.285 Pregnant people are often social-
ized to believe themselves ‘bad mothers’, ‘bad people’, or ‘unwomanly’, and are forced
to endure severe social consequences, where they choose not to embrace parenting
responsibilities after gestating.286 Some would argue that the point I have raised here
about the significance and severe consequences that result from unwilling biological
parenthood have the logical corollary that we should give the same consideration to
unwilling fathers as we do unwilling mothers. Should genetic progenitors who do not
gestate be able to demand that a person have an abortion resulting in fetal death so
that they can experience freedom from biological parenthood? The answer to this is
obviously no, as it would be deplorable to imagine individual pregnant people having
forced abortions in order to ensure the comfort of the other genetic progenitor. The
geography of conception, of embryogenesis and of gestation (that is in the female
body) and the physicality of a fetus (that it is part of the pregnant body)287 inevitably
means that guaranteeing the bodily autonomyof female people, their individuation and
boundaries of self, will always mean there is asymmetry in the decision making about
fetuses. While some men’s activists might cry out that this is unfair, because pregnant
people (mostly women) do have a greater say in decisions about a pregnancy, that is
not necessarily the accolade that men’s activists make it out to be. While a genetic
progenitor who does not gestate does not necessarily have the knowledge of a future
of biological parenthood forced upon them, people who become pregnant and then
face gestating and birthing always do. The existence of an unwanted biological child—
even if it is adopted—is oftenmore significant for peoplewho gestate and birth (usually
women) than it is for genetic progenitors who do not gestate (usually men). It is often
the starting presumption in both law and society that the best person to rear a child is its
biological parents,288 but in particular its biological and gestational mother. The ideol-
ogy of ‘motherhood’ following the physical and emotional connection in gestation can
be seen, very literally, to constrain the choices of peoplewhohavebirthed.289 While this
observation has been made in the bioethical literature, it is important to also observe
in this context the extent to which the law is also complicit in reinforcing the ‘ideology’
of motherhood. The law places these limitations on choice; a person cannot abdicate
‘motherhood’ before birth even in a gestational surrogacy arrangement,290 and the legal
285 Evans v Amicus Health Care, supra note 256, at para 89 per Arden LJ.
286 Romanis and Horn, supra note 89, at 184.
287 Kingma, supra note 4.
288 JillMarshall,Concealed Births, Adoption and Human Rights Law: Being Wary of Seeking to Open Windows into
People’s Souls, 71 Camb. Law J 325, 329 (2012).
289 Id., at 330.
290 Horsey has noted that ‘the law singularly fails to reflect . . . lived experience: the view of surrogates that they







/jlb/advance-article/doi/10.1093/jlb/lsab011/6279500 by guest on 21 M
ay 2021
34 • Abortion & ‘artificial wombs’
mother (the person who gestates and births)291 cannot formally assent to an adoption
until 6 weeks post-birth.292 People who gestate and birth and then either ‘give away’
their child (for adoption), or abandon it,293 often face serious social stigma; they are
often treated by those around them with disbelief and/or disdain.294 This imperative
tomother is legally enforced, and is a particularly genderedphenomenon, as it is usually
women who gestate and birth. Women who choose not to mother their offspring
are often treated as ‘unwomanly’ or ‘unfeminine’;295 and as having done something
contrary to their nature or what is natural. While fathers (male genetic progenitors)296
who abandon their caring responsibilities are afforded the label of ‘dead-beat dad’,
and often chastised, there is not the same assassination of their identity in addition
to their character. Generally, the perceptions of women who ‘give away’ their child
after birth are much worse, because they are always expected to be nurturing in nature
and to become the ‘primary care giver’.297 This is reinforced by the presumptions,
so engrained in the law, between the association between doing gestational work and
becoming the social mother of a resulting child. The pressure to ‘mother’ often begins
in pregnancy resulting from the significant societal and cultural expectations that are
placed on people during pregnancy,298 and as such, never becoming visibly pregnant
is often important to people who seek to have an abortion as soon as possible to avoid
such pressures. There are, in contrast, other ways in which some of the disadvantage
associated with becoming an unwilling father can be mitigated.299
It will be the case, as Kendal has emphasized that some pregnant people might
welcome AAPT as an alternative form of ending a pregnancy because they intend to
give up their fetus for adoption after birth.300 Some pregnant people, for example for
religious reasons, do prefer to pursue adoption rather than abortion as their solution to
291 Ampthill Peerage Case, supra note 151; Re G, supra note 15; R (on the application of TT) [2019] EWHC
2384 (Fam); R (on the application of McConnell) v Registrar General for England and Wales [2020] EWCA
Civ 559; Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act, s.33 (1).
292 Adoption and Children Act 2002, s.52 (3) states ‘any consent given by the mother to the making of an
adoption order is ineffective if it is given less than 6 weeks after the child’s birth’.
293 In England and Wales it remains a criminal offence for a pregnant person to ‘abandon a born child’
(effectively to have an anonymous birth) even if left in a safe space e.g. a hospital or GP office. In such an
instance, the person would be guilty of ‘exposure of a child under the age of two years’ by virtue of the
Offences Against the Person Act, s.27 and ‘child cruelty’ by virtue of the Children and Young Persons Act
1933, s.1. I am grateful to Dr EmmaMilne for discussion on these points.
294 See Katherine O’Donovan, Enfants Trouve’s, Anonymous Mothers and Children’s Identity Rights, in Human
Rights and Legal History, (K. O’Donovan and G. Rubin, eds, 2000).
295 Id.
296 It has been stipulated that, in law, only a male can be recognized as a father: J v C [2006] Civ 551; X, Y, Z v
UK [1997] Echr 20.
297 Dara Purvis, Expectant Fathers, Abortion and Embryos, 43 The Journal of Law, Medicine and Ethics
330, 331 (2015).
298 The pressure experienced socially during pregnancy manifests in a multitude of different ways including,
for example, public scrutiny of individual decisions and ‘advice giving’. Most importantly, a ‘fetus-first’
mentality, that exerts tremendous pressure on pregnant people to prioritize the welfare of their foetus when
pregnant, is not only culturally and socially engrained in England and Wales but, Milne argues, it has also
had a substantial influence on the development of the law: Emma Milne, Putting the Fetus First—Legal
Regulation, Motherhood and Pregnancy, 7MJG 149 (2020).
299 See Sally Sheldon, Unwilling Fathers and Abortion: Terminating Men’s Child Support Obligations? 66 Mod.
Law Rev. 175 (2003).
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anunwantedpregnancy.However, for themajority of people abortion affords closure in
a way that AAPT and adoption cannot.301 For the reasons explored above, it is impor-
tant that this closure is accessible. Pregnant people making choices about terminating
pregnancies in a world with AAPT that is magically non-invasive are making a choice
that is simultaneously about their body, and about their future as biological parents.
I think it is, therefore, proportionate to infringe on Brian’s right to family life by
prioritizing Abi’s right not to be a parent. Abi’s legal right not to be a parent is stronger
than Brian’s legal right to parenthood based on current persuasive precedent unless
there were some definitive statutory intervention to the contrary.
VII. CONCLUSION
It has been argued that the emergence of AAPT could afford putative fathers greater say
in abortion;302 specifically on the matter of how to terminate a pregnancy.303 AAPT
could be perceived as grounds for genetic progenitors that do not gestate but consider
themselves putative parents, and interested organizations,304 to launch a legal challenge
to the legality of a termination of pregnancy resulting in fetal deathwithout the consent
of the putative father. While many feminist scholars have before explained that AAPT
should not be considered an ‘alternative to abortion’;305 rhetoric that claims this as fact
continues to be perpetuated. In this article, I considered what kind of legal challenge
might be mounted by a genetic progenitor to abortion in the advent of AAPT to
determine the likelihood of its success within the contemporary legal framework. I
demonstrated thatAAPTwouldnot, unless therewere somechange to the law, improve
a genetic progenitor/putative parent’s prospects of interfering in abortion decisions.
Such an individual would not have the locus standi to mount a challenge. The law in
England andWales does not afford a genetic progenitor any right to seek an injunction
on such a matter. When two doctors agree that a pregnant person meets the criteria
for lawful abortion, they are exclusively empowered to choose to have that abortion
that their doctor has agreed they are eligible for. This would not, and ought not, change
with AAPT.
Allowing genetic progenitors to obtain injunctions to prevent abortion on the
grounds that partial ectogestation was safe and available would be inconsistent with
the pregnant person’s right to bodily autonomy protected by common law. There are
no circumstances in which the claims of a putative father can outweigh the entitlement
of a pregnant person to control their body and their pregnancy. I also demonstrated
that a pregnant person’s legal right not to become a parent is stronger than a genetic
progenitor (who does not gestate)’s legal right to become a parent. Claims about a
genetic progenitor’s right to parent a gestating entity overstate their interest in that
particular gestating entity.306 The law must protect a pregnant person’s choice to
301 Romanis and Horn, supra note 89, at 184.
302 Brassington, supra note 10; Räsänen, supra note 10.
303 Id.
304 Most challenges to abortion law in England andWales are funded by large organizations like the Society for
the Protection of Unborn Children or Christian Concern.
305 Cannold, supra note 87; Jackson, supra note 50, Romanis, supra note 7; Horn, supra note 35; Horn, supra
note 56; Romanis and Horn, supra note 89; Romanis, supra note 94.
306 The term gestating entity is used here to be inclusive of entities that are undergoing gestation in utero
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abort.307 To find otherwise would impose an unjustifiable burden on pregnant people’s
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307 This is not to say that the current law does this sufficiently. See Horn, supra note 35, for an account of why
‘artificial womb technology’ increases the necessity for abortion decriminalization. SeeRomanis, supranote
7, for the importance of decriminalization in respect of instances in which pregnant people want to opt out
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